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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Trade has existed among different societies throughout man's
known history. Its importance and advantages have long been recognized
and appreciated by the leaders and merchants of the world. In biblical
times, for example, great caravans of heavily-laden camels carried the
treasures of the East to the bustling centers of Damascus, Babflon. and
Memphis. Greece and Rome sent their legions to distant lands to secure
the highly valued and coveted exotic goods which were obtainable only
in these alien regions.
Rulers of the various states early learned the pecuniary gains
to be made from trade. Thus it was that tariffs and other restrictions
to trade by which rulers could make profits were erected with the be
ginnings of foreign trade.
However, with the collapse of the Roman Empire, the commencement
of what is known as the "Dark Ages" and the subsequent rise of the
feudal system throughout Europe, duties on external trade were greatly
increased. This trend culminated in the system of mercantilism, an
ideology, widely held by the leaders of the developing nation-states
of Europe. Mercantilist thought dictated that high barriers be erected
to imports so that a nation might become self-sufficient, and export
its surpluses in return for gold bullion.
After reaching a peak in the eighteenth century, the protection
ism of mercantilism slowly lost its popularity, and the economists of
the began instead to expound the advantages of freeing international
trade. The movement toward free trade has advanced at different rates
among the countries of the world since that time, and except for tem
porary efforts to raise barriers to trade in times of recession and '
depression, it can be generally stated that the nations of the world
have found it to their advantage economically to mutually lower inter
national barriers to trade.l The law of comparative advantage explains
the monetary advantages of trade.^ Trade gives political advantages
as well, for by tying nation-states together economically, it provides
them With common interests and goals, and unifies them in their opposi
tion to potentially harmful nations or blocs. Whether or not this
liberalizing trend in trade will continue into the future, and the re
sults of possible future world trade patterns in cattle and beef cattle
products on the United States and South Dakota will be considered in
this study.
The Problematic Situation
The United States of America has proven itself to be one of the
most efficient producers of industrial and agricultural goods in the
world. As a result. United States goods have been eagerly sought by
AppendirA! barriers," see the Glossary of Terms,
Of tei' Ap?e1d?x"!" "comparative advantage," see the Glossary
other countries, and the United States has benefited by exchanging
these goods for other corranodities produced by foreign nations.
Trade is important to the United States, International trade
is especially important to the agricultural sector of the United States
econotiy. Of the total United States exports in the 1962 calendar year
of $21,285,484,000, almost one-quarter, or $5,031,403,000 came from the
sale of agricultural commodities. On the other hand, only $3,875,537,000
of the $18,242,236,000 in goods and services imported by the United
States were agricultural. Thus there was a favorable balance of trade
in agricultural commodities of $1,155,866,000,^ It is estimated that
the produce of one out of every five acres of cropland in the United
States is exported annually,^ This large volume of agricultural ex
ports shows that many farmers in the United States are directly and
vitally dependent on foreign markets for a good part of their incomes.
Although fev7 cattle and little fresh beef are exported by the
United States, the exportation of beef products is considerable. Cat
tle hides and calf and kip skins, tallow and variety meats are important
export commodities of the United States. Imports into the United States
of cattle and beef products have been increasing considerably in the
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, U,^, Foreign Agricultural Trade by Commodities Calendar Year
1962. U.S.D.A,, Washington D.C., June 1963, p. 1.
^United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Export Fact Sheet. U.S.D.A,, Washington D.C,, March 1963,
p, 48,
past few years. Especially significant is the rise in United States
imports of manufacturing meats and live beef cattle.
United States trade policy, as exemplified at the May 1963 meet
ings in Geneva of members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) is to liberalize international trade on a most-favored-nation
basisBringing this policy into effect would, of course, mean that
restrictions on agricultural imports into the United States would be
decreased or eliminated in return for a mitigation or abolition of
import barriers by other countries to United States exports of agricul
tural commodities. GATT negotiations to liberalize trade, mainly be
tween the United States and the European Economic Community (also known
as the EEC, the Common Market, and the "Six")» will begin on May 4,
1964.
The Problem
Our generation is witnessing profound changes on the interna
tional scene. The birth of a new nation is not unusual, and many of
the older nations which played important roles in the great historical
events of the past are declining in power relative to the newer indus
trializing nations. Certainly, among the most far-reaching of all
changes is that which is presently taking place in Western Europe,
where the medieval concept of universality appears to be re-emerging.
1
For a definition of "most*favored-nation," see the Glossary of
Terms, Appendix A.
The establishment of sieveral intra-European organizations in the post
World War II period culminated in 1957 in the formation of an European
Economic Community consisting of France, the Federal Republic of Ger
many, Italy and the three Benelux countries: the Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg. Although primarily an economic union in which internal
barriers are to be abolished within a set period of time, it has
political overtones and it is envisaged by many that this economio com
munity is but a first stage in the ultimate political union of Western
Europe. Exactly how this union will develop is impossible to say.
Changes in policy in Europe and in the United States have not ceased.
It is a very dynamic subject with which this thesis deals. Just as
the Common Market could become a powerful economic and political entity,
so could it be broken up overnight by a political leader. President
de Gaulle of France has already threatened that if an agricultural
policy for the EEC is not agreed upon by December 31, 1963, France will
withdraw from the Community. This would destroy the EEC, If the EEC
does overcome this hurdle, there will be other crises as well in the '
future.
The six European nations are now attempting to develop a single
agricultural policy and will soon begin to bargain in international
trade negotiations as a unit, rather than as six separate nations. The
United States may therefore, in the future, have to deal with the six
EEC nations collectively to win trade concessions rather than with the
individual member countries. This means that it will be extremely
important for the United States to deal in a very competent manner with
the Common Market.
The problem is that the development of a common agricultural
policy (CAP) by the EEC will affect present world trade patterns in
cattle and beef products. Such a single policy by the six nations will
have a different effect on trade in these commodities than the present
collective effect of the individual agricultural policies of the member
nations. This in turn will influence exports and imports by the United
States of cattle and beef products and will thus affect the South Dakota
cattlemen and the South Dakota economy.
The beef cattle industry is an important one in the United States,
It is especially important in South Dakota which has ranked fourth
among states in the union since 1931 in total numbers of beef cows.
In the 1956-60 period, 41.1 percent of cash farm incomes in South Dakota
came from cattle and calves. To illustrate the growing importance of
cattle in the state, this figure can be compared to that of the 1940-44
period when only 20,2 percent of farm cash income came from cattle and
calves,^ The United States is a large exporter of beef cattle products
and a very important importer of cattle and beef and veal. Obviously
then, a change in world trade of cattle and beef products brought about
by a new agricultural policy for the six EEC nations will affect
United States Department of Agriculture, Crop and Livestock
Reporting Service, A Century of South Dakota Livestock. U.S.D.A.,
Washington D.C., 1961, p. 6.
exports and imports of these commodities by the United States, and will
therefore affect the United States beef cattle industry and the cattle
ranchers and feeders of South Dakota.
The manner in which United States' agriculture in general and
the South Dakota beef cattle industry in particular will be affected
will depend ultimately on the agricultural policy formulated by the
EEC. The development of such a CAP is a long and arduous task, for the
farm interest groups in each of these countries are reluctant to allow
their governments to make concessions that would not be in the
farmers' interests.
However, it is hoped that a CAP will be agreed upon for the 1964
GATT negotiations in Geneva. This EEC policy could favor the liberali
zation of agricultural trade or could take a protectionist approach.
In other terminology, the Common Market could be an outward-looking,
free trading community, possibly numbering as its members all or most
of the countries of Western Europe, or it could attempt to be a six
nation, inward-looking, French-led third world force. Whatever policy
it chooses to follow, the South Dakota cattlemen and thus the South
Dakota economy will be affected. Each policy, of course, will have a
different effect.
Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the extent to which
selected EEC agricultural policy alternatives would affect United States
imports and exports of cattle and beef products, and to hazard conclu
sions concerning the effects of the various EEC policies on the South
Dakota cattlemen. This involves an examination of United States trade
in these commodities and of alternative Common Market policies and the
future trade patterns which would result from each. It is hoped that
the facts assembled herein concerning international trade in cattle and
beef products will be of assistance to South Dakota ranchers, feeders
and other interested people.
This thesis raises many questions as to what can be done to
anticipate and deal with effectively, problems which will adversely
affect South Dakota, and also what courses of action by the United
States Government would best serve South Dakota's interests. However,
solutions to such problems will not be proposed in this thesis.
Procedure
The first step will be an examination of exports and imports by
the major world traders of cattle and beef cattle products. This will
allow estimates to be made of the extent to which exports of these com
modities would be curtailed or encouraged by various EEC policies, and
calculations of what might be alternative trade patterns for them if
EEC policies discouraged imports of these commodities by the Six to a
greater degree than would be the case under a continuation of national
policies.
Then an analysis of United States imports and their sources and
United States exports and their destinations will be made. Imports
and exports will be examined by commodities. This will allow a better
examination of the effects of competition exerted by imports and bene
fits to United States cattlemen from exports than would otherwise be
possible. It will also permit an analysis of the degree to which United
States imports and exports of each individual beef cattle products may
be affected by changes in the patterns of world trade, resulting from
the future CAP,
The role played by South Dakota beef cattle in the United States
beef cattle industry will then be examined so that the effects on the
United States beef cattle industry, of policy changes in the Common Mar
ket, may be correspondingly measured on the South Dakota cattlemen.
Then, pursuing this course more thoroughly, an analysis of the importance
of the South Dakota beef cattle industry in the state economy will be
computed, so that the effects of a new EEC agricultural policy can
later be measured on the South Dakota economy as a whole.
It will then be necessary to look at the Common Market itself.
Its historical background, aims, conditions for membership and common
agricultural policy will be given particular attention. The various
policies it could choose to follow in agriculture will be individually
examined. Present imports of cattle, beef products and feed grains, and
the chief suppliers of these imports will be examined. Projection
requirements to 1970 under the different policy assumptions will be
made, and then the effects of each one of these policies on the chief
world exporting nations and the United States will be measured.
Finally, the corresponding effects on the South Dakota ranchers, feed
ers and the state economy as a whole will be estimated.
CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CATTLE, BEEF CATTLE
PRODUCTS AND FEED GRAINS
If, as the title of this thesis suggests, changes in the patterns
of international trade in beef cattle and their products would result
because of the future EEC common agricultural policy, then it is essen
tial that a study of present international trade in these commodities
be made. Only by so doing can a realistic estimate of possible re
direction of trade be made. It will be necessary to examine exports
and imports by the major world traders of cattle and beef products, so
that later estimations can be made of the extent to which exports of
these commodities would be curtailed under protectionist EEC policies,
and so that calculations may be made of what might be alternative trade
patterns for them, A brief summary of world trade in feed grains will
also be made because of the fact that a future Common Market CAP may
affect the price of United States feed grains, and this in turn would
affect the United States beef cattle industry.
To give a general idea of the relative importance of beef to
different countries, it will be necessary to briefly examine beef pro
duction in the nations of the world. According to the 1962 United
States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, the produc
tion of beef and veal in the 41 leading beef producing countries
amounted to 51,999,000,000 pounds in 1961, Since this figure includes
almost all of the world's most important beef producing countries, the
relative importance of the United States as a beef and veal producer
is unmistakable. The United States produced, in 1961, 16,341,000,000
pounds, or 31 percent of total world production. The Soviet Union was
second with 5,090,000,000 pounds, not quite one-third of total United
States production. Argentina was third with 4,409,000,000 pounds.
However, it may be noted that on a per capita basis, Argentina produced
over twice as much beef and veal as the United States. The Common Mar
ket, with 8,088,000,000 pounds, produced about half the United States*
total. France proved to be the greatest producer among EEC members
and accounted for 40 percent of EEC production of beef and veal. West
Germany and Italy followed France in importance. Other important world
producers of beef include Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa.^
Production of beef is certainly not in proportion to each coun
try's cattle numbers. If this were the case, then India would surely
be the most important beef producer in the world, for India has approxi
mately one-quarter of the world's cattle numbers, estimated in January
1963 to be 1,078,000,000.^ The United States, with almost one-third
^United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics
1962. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1963, p. 423.
^United States Department of Agriculture, Economics Research
Service, Livestock and Meat Situation. LMS-131, U.S.D.A., Washington
D.C., July 1963, p. 25.
Table 1. World Exports of Cattle and Beef Products,
1960 and 1961
Commodit'
Cattle
Beef: fresh,
chilled & frozen 601
Offal 6c other meat
(variety meats)
Canned meat
Value
per
ton
dol.
U.S.
141
443
900
Value per head
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Tra^
Yearbook. Rome, 1962, p. 37.
1960
1000
m. t.
3,250
927
269
442
Computed
Value
458
557
119
398
Thousand head
Value
per
ton
U.S.
129
557
424
895
1961
Total
Exports
lllIlTf
m.t.
3,920
997
274
467
Computed
Value
mil.dol
506
547
116
418
of beef and veal production had only 104,000,000 cattle, not quite
one-tenth of the world beef numbers.^
Value of World Exports of Cattle and Beef Cattle Products
Now it will be necessary to consider trade in beef cattle and
beef products. Table 1 shows the relative importance of the various
types of beef exports. Table 1 shows that fresh, chilled and frozen
beef is the most important of the various cattle and beef cattle prod
ucts in world trade. In the year 1961, the value of world trade in this
commodity was $547,000,000. This was slightly below the 1960 figure.
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-129, U.S.D.A., Washington
D.C., March 1963, p. 25.
Behind beef In international Importance Is live cattle. Trade
In cattle In 1961 was valued at $506,000,000, However, unlike trade In
beef, trade In live cattle Is usually between nations which are geo
graphically close. Thus, a substantial share of the world's trade Is
between the United States on the one hand, and Mexico and Canada on the
other. Trade In live cattle and calves between Western European nations
Is also very large.
The value of world trade In canned meat was $418,000,000 In
1961, It should be noted that the term "meat" and not "beef" Is used.
The exact proportion of beef In total exports of canned meats Is uncer
tain, However, It has been assumed that beef would make up approxi
mately one-third to one-half of this total world export figure of canned
meats.
Much of the same statement must be made for the commodity "offals
and other meats," for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAG), Trade Yearbook, from which these figures were
taken Is not explicit about the composition of these products. It Is
the considered opinion, however, among specialists In the meat field
at South Dakota State College with whom the author has spoken, that the
greatest part of "offals" would be composed of offals from cattle.
Although the exact proportion of beef In some of these commodi
ties Is In doubt. It may nevertheless be concluded, even considering
the minimum assumptions concerning beef content, that world trade In
cattle and beef cattle products Is very large. Many cattlemenIn many
countries obviously depend on world markets for a good part of their
Incomes.
World Trade In Specific Commodities
A closer examination will now be made of International trade
In cattle and beef products. Special attention will be given to the
principal world exporters and Importers of these commodities and to
their Importance In total world trade. Tables 2 and 3 give a rather
complete summary of International trade In these commodities for the
1961 calendar year#
Cattle
Table 2, which considers only Imports, shows that the greatest
Importers of cattle In the world are found In Western Europe and the
United States. The EEC accounted In 1961 for 22.7 percent of all Imports
of cattle and the United Kingdom for 17.9 percent# Western Europe Im
ported 47#4 percent of the total exports of cattle In the 1961 calendar
year# In the Western Hemisphere, the United States Is by far the most
significant importer of cattle# In 1961, the United States accounted
for 27 percent of total world Imports of 3,860,000 head of cattle#
Concerning exports of cattle. Table 3 shows that the Common Mar
ket Is relatively unimportant, and shipped only seven percent of world
exports of cattle to foreign countries in 1961. When the other coun
tries are added In, however. Western European exports are quite large.
Western Europe, In 1961 accounted for almost 40 percent of world
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exports of cattle, Denmark and Ireland are by far the most important
European exporters of live cattle, Irish exports accounted for 40 per
cent of all Western European exports and Danish exports made up 20,5
percent. In the Western Hemisphere, Canada and Mexico were the most
important exporters, accounting for 27 percent of world exports. Other
exporters of significance were found in the northern, formerly French-
controlled cattle-grazing areas of Africa.
Fresh and Frozen Beef and Veal
More important to this study is an examination of world trade in
fresh, chilled, and frozen beef. Trade in this commodity has been in
creasing appreciably because of rising standards of living, increasing
populations, high world beef prices, and the development throughout the
world of modern meat packing facilities.
The Common Market in 1961 accounted for about one-fifth of total
world imports of beef. Western Europe took 61.2 percent of all imports.
Clearly, then, the Western European beef market is of utmost importance
for the major world exporters of beef. The United States has surpris
ingly also become an important market for exporters of beef. In 1961,
the United States imported 28.6 percent of total world exports of beef.
The major exporters of beef in the world, according to Table 3,
are found outside of Europe. Argentina supplied 27.2 percent of world
exports of beef in 1961. Normally, Argentina's share of world exports
is greater, but it is presently holding back its cull cows to build up
future stocks. It is expected that in the years ahead, Argentina will
be able to at least maintain and possibly even increase its present
share of world exports of beef and veal» Australia . and New Zealand to
gether exported 25.6 percent of world exports of this commodity.
Western Europe made up almost 30 percent of total world exports in
1961, but this was not even half of the amount it imported. So it be
comes clear then, that the major V70rld importers of beef include
Western Europe, and in particular the United Kingdom, which in the
1958-61 period took almost 40 percent of entire world imports. The
United States also is a large importer. These countries were supplied
by exports from Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and France, among
others.
Canned Meats
Canned meats, which are not made up exclusively of beef, is
another important trading commodity. The major world importers in 1961
included the United Kingdom with almost half of all imports and the
United States with 22,4 percent. Principal world exporters were the
EEC, in which the Netherlands was most important, Denmark, with 17 per
cent of world exports, and Argentinn wit'h 15,4 percent. So the Common
Market is not an importer of canned goods, but has instead a favorable
balance of trade in canned meats of 134,600 metric tons,^
^For a definition of "favorable balance of trade," see the Glos
sary of Terms, Appendix A,
Offal, Game and Other Meat
The six Common Market countries imported 34 percent of the
world's trade in offals in 1961. The United Kingdom imported 47.6 per
cent of world offal exports. Thus, Uestern Europe accounted for the
gigantic total of 82.7 percent of world imports of offals. Exports of
this commodity came from the United States, which accounted for 21.6
percent of v7orld offal exports in 1961, and Argentina with 17 percent.
The Western Hemisphere supplied 47.4 percent, or almost half the world's
exports of offals, Oceania in 1961 exported 17.5 percent of the world
total.
Tallow and Greases
Only export figures are available for tallow and greases in these
tables, but it can be seen that the United States is the outstanding
exporter of tallow and greases in the world, accounting for approximately
75 percent, or three-quarters of all tallow and greases exported in
1961. Western Europe is the United States' chief customer for this
commodity
Hides and Skins
The EEC is the world's greatest import market for hides and
skins. In 1961, it took 44 percent of world exports of this commodity.
It is, however, very difficult to state the portion of hides and skins
in world trade from bovine sources. Such information is not given by
the FAO. The United Kingdom is also an important importer of hides and
skins. It took 15.5 percent of world exports in 1961. Western Europe
accounted for approximately two-thirds of world cattle and calf hides
and skins imports. The United States imported 18 percent of the world
imports of this commodity.
Forty percent of hides and skins exports originated in Western
Europe. The United States was the most important exporter in the
Western Hemisphere, accounting for 17.3 percent of all exports of this
commodity. Oceania exported 13,5 percent of hides arid skins in world
trade.
International Trade in Feed Grains
A study of international trade in feed grains, as well as cattle
and beef cattle products must be made, if the effects of a new common
agricultural policy for the EEC on the United States beef cattle indus
try and the South Dakota cattlemen are to be judged. If the new CAP of
the Common Market affects grain prices within the United States, this
will have a corresponding effect on the prices of livestock products,
and beef cattle in particular, in the United States. If exports of
grains from the United States were considerably restricted for example,
because of a restrictionist CAP, then surpluses would accumulate in
the United States, grain prices would likely drop, and livestock pro
duction would probably increase. Undoubtedly, many farmers would use
some of their acreage which had formerly been used to grow feed grains.
to graze cattle instead. It may thus be concluded that what the
European Economic Community does in its CAP regarding feed grains in
the future will surely directly concern the beef producers in the United
States.
If the Common Market should follow a liberal agricultural policjr,
and increase imports of feed grains from the United States, prices would
remain relatively high in the United States, and farmers would be en
couraged to continue production at the same high level. This would also
be true of other world feed grain exporters. A protectionist policy
would cause surpluses to accrue in the other major exporting nations,
and prices would almost certainly fall in the world feed grain markets.
This would mean that the prices of feed grains exports to countries
outside of the Common Market would likely be lower than before the CAP
came into existence.
Tables 2 and 3 include world trade figures for feed grains in the
1961 calendar year. Western Europe is the most significant importer of
feed grains. The Common Market took over 38 percent of all feed grain
exports in 1961 and the United Kingdom alone took almost 19 percent,
Japan seemed to be the only importer of feed grains of any significance
outside of Europe, Japan took 8.1 percent of world imports of feed
grains in 1961.
On the export side, the most important nation is the United
States. The United States, in 1961, accounted for over 40 percent of
all world exports of feed grains. Other iiuoortant exporters included
Argentina, with 9.5 percent, and Canada with 6.0 percent. Oceania,
Mexico and South Africa exported slightly smaller portions of world ex
ports than did Canada.
CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF CATTLE AND BEEF CATTLE PRODUCTS
The United States has, for several decades, imported more cattle
and beef products than is has exported, Mueh to the consternation of
livestock producers as a whole, the United States, since 1558, has been
a net importer of total livestock and livestock products as well.
However, it is not the intention in this chapter to illustrate the
growing reliance of the American people on foreign markets for livestock
products, but rather to analyze the importation of cattle and beef
products, their quantities, values, and sources.
United States restrictions on imports of cattle and beef cattle
products appear to be moderate, at least in comparison to those of most
other countries. For example, imports of live cattle under 200 pounds
have a 1.5 cent per pound import duty. However, 2.5 cents a pound is
charged on cattle in this category after 200,000 have been imported in
any one year. Cattle v/eighing 200-700 pounds are charged 2,5 cents a
pound, and cattle over 700 pounds for not over 400,000 cattle in any
year are charged 1,5 cents a pound. Fresh, chilled or frozen beef
enters at 3 cents a pound, and boneless beef and veal enter at a 2,5 cent
a pound duty. Edible meat offals are charged one cent a pound if valued
not over 20 cents a pound, and if valued over 20 cents a pound, come
Table 4. Imports of Cattle and Beef Cattle Products, and
Comparison with United States Production, 1962
Quantity^ Imports as
Imports of U. S. Percent of
Item Value Quantity Production Production
mll.dol. mil. lb. mil, lb.
Beef:
Bone-In, fresh, chilled,
frozen 5.7 18.8
Boneless 258.1 819.1
Canned, Including corned 28.5 84.0
Pickled and cured 0.3 0.5
Veal, fresh or frozen 8.9 25.5
Other meat, canned, pre
pared gr preserved,
n.e.c. 10.6 23.1
Total 312.1 971.0
Total carcass weight
equivalent — 1,445.0
mll.dol. 1000 head
Cattle and Calves:
Under 200 pounds 2.0 66
200-700 pounds 85.4 1,042
700 pounds and over.
dairy 3.7 16
700 pounds and over.
n. e. s. ^ 19.3 109
Bulls for breeding 0.9 1
Cows for breeding 5.2 16
Total 116.5 1,250
Carcass weight equivalent
(mil. lbs.) 200
Hides and Skins;
Buffalo hides
Calf skins
Cattle hides
Kip skins
Total
mll.dol. 1000 lbs.
16,300
34,700'
)ercent
)ercent
Table 4. (Continued)
Item
p»11» lb« mil, lb. percent
Oils, £ats and greases:
Oleomargarine 0.7 1.4
Stearlc acid t 5 /
Tallow, edible and Inedible 6 / 1.6
Other oils and fats, edible 6 / 5__/
Other fats, greases and
oils. Inedible 6 / 0.2
Total 0.8 3.2
Total value of cattle and
beef cattle products
Imports 447.7
Comoerclal as reported, plus estimates for farm
^Not elsewhere classified
^Wot elsewhere specified
^Thousand head slaughtered
^Under 500,000 pounds
^Under $500,000
Sources: 1) Don Paarlberg "The Rise In Meat Imports," Economic and
Marketing Informatinn for Indiana Farmers, Purdue Univer
sity, Lafayette, Indiana, July 31, 1963
2) United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Livestock and Meat Situation, IMS-130, U.S.D.A.,
May 1963, p. "^0.
3) United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, The Current and Prospective Cattle Situation.
U.S.D.A., April 1963, Washington D.C., pp. 12-13.
4) United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul
tural Service, U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade by
Commodities. 1962, U.S.D.A., Washington D.C., June 1963,
pp. 24-26.
Into the United States at five percent ad volorem» Other beef sausage
enters at 10 percent ad valorem#^
Table 4 is very important to the analysis of imports of cattle
and beef cattle products in this chapter• It may be noted that the
total value of cattle and beef cattle products imports was $447,700,000
in 1962. This large sum seems to be made up almost entirely of com
modities listed under the two headings, "beef" and "cattle and calves,"
United States Imports of Cattle and Calves
In numbers as well as value, 1962 proved to be a record year for
imports of cattle and calves. A total of 1,250,000 cattle and calves
was imported by the United States in the 1962 calendar year. In
dollar terms, this amounted to $112,800,000, or 25.6 percent of all
United States cattle and beef cattle product imports. The great majority
of these imported cattle, 1,042,000 to be specific, was between the
weights of 200 and 700 pounds. It may be generally stated that cattle
in this weight group are bought primarily for feeding purposes by United
States cattle feeders whose purpose it is to fatten these cattle on
United States feed grains and then to sell them to be slaughtered. The
number of head of cattle imported in 1962 was equal to 3.6 percent of
the total numbers of cattle slaughtered in 1962. However, only 1.7
^United States Tariff Commission, "Schedule 1 - Animal and
Vegetable Products," Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated
(1963). Washington D.C., April 1963, pp. 9-12.
percent of the beef and veal consumed in the United States in 1962 came
from these imports of live cattle.
Canada and Mexico are the sources of United States imports of
cattle and calves. In 1962, Canada exported 497,954 of the total
1,249,891 cattle and calves imported by the United States, and Mexico
supplied the remaining 751,937 head of cattle and calves. Mexico
supplied approximately two-thirds of total cattle and calves in the
feeder category (200 - 700 pounds). Canada supplied almost all United
States imports of breeding cattle.^
It is unlikely that the future will present any major new ex
porters of live cattle to the United States, Shipment of these cattle
makes it very difficult. It is possible, however, that exports from
Canada and Mexico will continue to expand in the future, for they have
increased greatly in numbers in the past, and as long as United States
feeders find it profitable to import cattle and calves, these two
neighboring countries will undoubtedly be very willing to continue in
their capacity as suppliers of live cattle and calves. In 1952, total
exports of cattle and calves from these two countries to the United
2States amounted to only 143,063 head. The rate of increase, it may
thus be seen, has been great.
^United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser
vice, Livestock and Meat Situation. LMS-130, U.S.D.A., Washington D.C.,
May 1963, p. 23.
^Livestock and Meat Situation. LMS-130, 0£. ^t., p. 23.
United States Imports of Beef and Veal
Now it will be necessary to pay much closer attention to beef
and veal, the commodity which has been presenting the greatest problem
to those people concerned with beef imports. Imports of beef and veal,
(see Table 4), totaled $312,100,000 in 1962, This is 70,8 percent of
the entire value of imports of cattle and beef cattle products. The
combined value of cattle and calves Imports and beef and veal consti
tutes 96,4 percent of all imports of cattle and beef products.
In terms of quantity as well as value, "boneless beef" is the
singularly most important import item. In 1962, 819,100,000 pounds of
boneless beef entered the United States from foreign countries. Thus,
out of the total imports of 971,000,000 pounds, boneless beef in terms
of quantity made up approximately 84 percent of beef and veal imports,
and in value, it comprised approximately 83 percent of all beef and
veal imported in the 1962 calendar year.
The total of 971,000,000 pounds imported amounted to a carcass
weight equivalent of 1,445,000,000 pounds. Total production in the
United States in 1962 was 16,300,000,000 pounds. Thus, imports of beef
and veal were 8.9 percent of total domestic production of beef and veal.
Reduced to their carcass weight equivalent, imported beef cattle
and calves equaled 280,000,000 pounds. Total carcass weight equivalent
of imports of beef and veal therefore equaled 1,745,000,000 pounds.
These imports as a percent of total United States production amounted
to 10.6 percent of total domestic beef production. As an Illustration
of the rapid growth in imports of these commodities, the 1962 percentage
may be compared to that in 1956. Imports of beef and veal and carcass
weight equivalent of cattle in 1956 hit a low of 1.6 percent of total
domestic production.^
Sources of Beef and Veal Imports
The sources of United States beef and veal imports are shovm in
Table 5. It can be quickly seen how greatly the picture has changed
since the 1951-55 period. Imports in this period averaged 206,784,000
pounds compared to the 970,945,000 pounds imported in 1962. Imports
have thus more than qoadtupled in the last decade.
In the 1951-55 average period, the principal suppliers of United
States imports of beef and veal were Argentina, Mex^^co, Canada and
Uruguay. These four countr*.es accounted for 84 percent of United States
beef and veal imports. Argentina alone supplied 47 percent of United
States imports. In the 1962 calendar year, however, the situation seems
to have changed considerably. Argentina, which had supplied almost
half of United States imports of beef and veal in the 1951-55 period,
in 1962 accounted for only 4.7 percent of total United States imports
of this commocity. Canada's share of total imports was only 7.0 percent
and Mexico's only 6.1 percent. In 1962, the great suppliers of beef
^United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser
vice, Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-134, U.S.D.A., Washington D.C.,
November 1963, p. 46T
Table 5, United States Imports of Beef and Veal, Product TJelght
Basis, by Country of Origin, Average 1951-55,
Annual 1959-62
Countr
1,000
pounds
1,000
pounds
1,000
pounds
1,000
pounds
1,000
pounds
7o of U.S.
Imports
1962
New Zealand 12,990 160,937 130,695 154,329 213,556 22.00
Argentina 97,562 62,911 47,553 56,467 45,818 4.72
Mexico 35,435 48,541 39,042 53,336 59,233 6.10
Canada 25,360 22,321 13,747 32,119 19,143 1.97
Ireland 7,187 41,977 43,615 61,098 70,725 7.28
Australia 1,411 223,941 144,665 232,164 444,730 45.80
Brazil 2,828 20,805 8,417 13,960 13,539 1.40
Uruguay 15.612 8,911 10,753 14,781 16,117 1.66
Paraguay 610 8,863 9,732 10,081 8,167 0.84
Dominican -
Republic 3,119 5,368 5,488 3,829 739 0.08
Costa Rica 9,759 15,334 8,713 8,106 0.83
Cuba 8 2,262 293 - - - - - - - -
United Kingdom 66 1,698 2.988 1,312 6,891 0.71
Nicaragua - - - 5,764 10,033 14,577 15,795 1.63
Honduras 311 1,509 3,391 5,525 9,324 0.96
Other Countries 51 §82 550 3,415 15,936 1.64
Other meat 1/ 2/4,234 96,099 21,309 23,866 23,126 2.38
Total 206,784 722,348 512,605 689,572 970,945 100.00
\l Other meat, canned, prepared or preserved. This is a miscellaneous
category which since 1959 has been mostly uncanned cooked beef, and
before that, lightly salted boneless beef.
2/ Excludes estimated amounts of boneless beef included in this
category prior to 1954.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Meat
Products Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, June 4, 1963.
and veal Imports by the United States proved to be Australia, with 45.8
percent and New Zealand with 22.0 percent of United States imports of
beef and veal. Together, these tv7o countries shipped 658,268,000
pounds of the total 970,945,000 pounds of beef and veal imported by
the United States, In other words, the Oceania countries made up 67,8
percent, over two-thirds, of total United States imports of beef and
veal. Occupying third place in importance among suppliers of United
States imported beef and veal was Ireland, In 1962, it shipped
70,725,000 pounds of beef and veal to the United States, equal to 7,3
percent of total United States imports.
The question may be asked why it is that Australia and New Zealand
have become such important ejcporters of beef and veal to the United
States in such a short period of time. The answer to this question is
that production in both countries has grown greatly because of strong
government support. Beef cattle producers have been given many incen
tives by the gov rnments of these Oceania countries to increase their
production. Also, one of the post-war measures originally taken to in
crease Australian production, that of an agreement with the United
Kingdom to supply large amounts of beef and veal annually, was terminated
in 1958, Australia then became free to export its processing beef to
other parts of the v;orld. It was quick to take advantage of the higher
prices in the American market. As long as United States prices remain
high in relation to other importers, it may be expected that Australia,
Zealand, and other exporting nations will continue to try to develop
greater markets for their beef and veal in this country.
During this same period. Argentine exports to the United States
have fallen in quantity as well as in proportion to the other principal
exporting nations. The reason that Argentina did not take advantage of
high prices and the high level of demand for beef in the United States
as did Australia. New Zealand, and Ireland, is that Argentina has been
building up its stock of beef cattle, and has not had surpluses of
manufacturing beef to send to the United States. More significantly,
united States imports of Argentine beef has been very greatly limited
because of an incidence of hoof-and-mouth disease in Argentina.
Other imports of beef and veal in 1962 came fromoother Latin
A,„erican countries. The areas north of the Panama Canal can ship fresh
beef because cattle in these countries are free of hoof-and-mouth
disease. Imports from the Central American countries in proportion to
total import, of beef and veal are still relatively small, but have in
creased rapidly in the past few years. Imports from Costa Rica.
Guatemala. Honduras. Nicaragua and Panama increased from 176,000 pounds
in 1956 to 35.000.000 pounds in 1962. Hew and improved slaughter
houses are being built, meat plants are being opened, and the use of
modern refrigeration has increased greatly. It is expected tha p
duction of beef and veal in these countries and consequently exports of
these commodities from Central America will increase rapidly in the
future. Of course, the United States will be the primary target as a
market for their increased exports.
Imports of Boneless Beef
As stated above, over 80 percent of all United States imports
of beef and veal consist of boneless beef for manufacturing purposes.
As a matter of fact, about one-third of total United States manufac
turing meat used in such items as hamburgers, sausages and frankfurters
comes from foreign sources. What is the reason for this?
The explanation is simply that there is a market for these meats.
The United States producers have not been able to supply domestic demand
for manufacturing meat products and exporters of these commodities have
thus filled in the gap. It should be explained, however, so that the
impression is not given that United States producers have been unable
to increase production of beef and veal, that production of this com
modity has grov;n considerably in the past. In fact, beef and veal pro
duction increased from 10,819,000,000 pounds in 1952 to 16,311,000,000
pounds in 1962.^ These increases have been mainly in bone-in beef and
veal. Little bone-in or chilled beef has been imported. The domestic
producer has found it less profitable to fulfill the demand for the
poorer-quality manufacturing meat while markets for the higher quality
products were available.
'Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-134, 0£. cit., p. 46.
The increase in manufacturing beef imports is explained by the
cattle cycle. Cattle stocks are presently being increased to enable
domestic producers to fulfill future demands for cattle and beef prod
ucts, Cows that would normally be culled and whose meat would be used
for manufacturing purposes are being held back for breeding purposes
in order that beef cattle numbers may be increased. This has been the
case since 1957 when the cattle cycle took a turn and numbers of cattle
in the United States began to be increased. Thus it is argued by some
that imports of manufacturing beef have had little adverse effects on
United States cattlemen, and rather that they have been beneficial, for
imports have ensured a steady supply of this meat to the American con
sumers, and have kept prices stable. If demand for beef continues to
be strong as has been the case in the past, and population continues to
grow at a high rate, it is conceivable that there will only be a small
downturn in the cattle cycle, if any at all. The need to hold cows
back in the future to continue increasing cattle numbers is conceivable.
In this case, imports would continue to enter the United States at high
prices. If, on the other hand, production of manufacturing beef in the
United States increases substantially, and if imports continue at the
same high level, then prices will fall, and the United States cattlemen
will be hurt over and above any present adverse effect resulting from
present imports.
Imports of Other Beef Cattle Products
Of the remaining beef cattle products imported by the United
States, the most important is "hides and skins." Table 4 shows that
imports of hides and skins from bovine animals amounted to $15,300,000
in 1962. This is not even four percent in value of total imports of
cattle and beef products. Kip skins were most important. The value of
the other general commodity, listed in Table 4 under the heading of
"oils, fats and greases," is practically negligible. Total imports of
these products amounted to only $800,000 in 1962.
American public Opinion on imports of Cattle
and Beef Cattle Products
Imports of cattle and beef cattle products in 1962, totaling
$447,000,000 constitute a significant portion of total production.
Though a poor figure for comparison, it may be noted that total cash
receipts from farm marketings of cattle and calves in 1962 was $8,146,
1
000,000. Cattlemen in the United States have been keenly aware of
competition from these imports. A reaction rather typical of cattle
men concerning beef imports by the United States was printed in the
editorial page of the "Brookings Register" newspaper, in July, 1963.
Concerning beef imports, Mr. Dwight Holaway had this to say:
Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-131, 0£. cit., p. 21.
with millions of United States acres lying idle in soil bank,
with millions of bushels of seed grains lying in storage (all
at no little cost to the government and United States taxpayer)
and with thousands of farmers leaving their farms annually, must
we open our shores and pocketbooks to these imports of foreign
meats?!
This attitude is echoed by livestock organizations. The National
Livestock Feeders Association, for example, stated its opinion in a
memorandum to Christian A. Herter, United States trade ambassador. It
pointed out that because imports have risen over 40 percent following
the 1958 tarrif reductions on boneless beef and veal, some measures
ought to be taken to protect the United States cattlemen.
Imports of beef and veal are now approaching the 10 percent level
of domestic production. In our opinion, a 5% level can be in
jurious to domestic producers; surely a 10% level is depressing
to the degree of being detrimental to the stability of the United
States market. We have conferred with the officials of the Live
stock and Meat Products Division, Foreign Agricultural Service,
USDA, on this subject.
Since beef and veal imports are on the upswing when domestic
production is being increased, the National Livestock Feeders Associa
tion suggests that
A system of flexible duties and import quotas tied inversely to
domestic production would constitute an ideal method of handling
meat imports. Such a system v/ould provide for a measure of
24 1963^^^^^ Holov7ay, editorial, Brookings Register. Bropkings, July
National Livestock Feeders Association, Memorandum to Christian
A. Herter. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. ReT Imports
of Meat and Meat .^ducts in Foreign Trade Negotiations. Omaha. Anril
3, 1963, pp. 3-4.
protection for United States grov;ers and feeders and yet allow for
trade with other countries.^
Consumers of course are overwhelmingly In favor of increased im
ports of beef and veal. They argue that imports of beef help to stabi
lize prices and supply and thus fill a useful role for both United
States producers and consumers. Since it is largely processing meats
that are imported the price of high quality beef and the price of fed
2
cattle are therefore little affected by such imports. Furthermore,
they argue that if the United States can expect to continue its high
level of grain exports because its efficiency in grain production is
greater than that of the importing nations, how can the United States
turn around and refuse entrance of lower-priced manufacturing beef into
the United States? This v7ould be entirely inconsistent and only invite
retaliation by foreign governments.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Public Law 87-794) contains
provisions to extend assistance to firms or workers adversely affected
by increased imports resulting from trade concessions. If any further
concessions are granted to foreign exporters of beef and beef products
by the United States government, then cattlemen, their associations,
^National Livestock Feeders Association, Memorandum to Christian
h' Herter. Special Representative for Trade Nef^otiations. Re; Imports
of Meat and Meat Products in Foreign Trade Negotiations, Omaha, April
3, p. 4.
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service, Trends in U, Imports of Manufacturing Beef. FAS-M-73,
U.S.D.A., Washington D.C., November 1959, p. 7.
and meat packing companies, upon showing that they are being adversely
affected, will qualify for government aid in the form of tariff relief,
tax assistance for firms, retraining of personnel involved or other
manners of redressing their complaints.
A quick attempt will be made to determine whether or not it is
true that prices have been affected by these imports. It is likely that
imports have had some effect on United States prices, but to state the
exact degree to which prices have been affected is impossible. In so
far as imports of processing meats compete with domestic beef used for
processing purposes, such as hamburgers and frankfurters, there is com
petition. But there has been such a shortage in supply of these meats
in recent years, that prices of manufacturing meats have not fallen.
If manufacturing beef had not been imported, it is likely that prices
of manufacturing beef would have risen, and less would have been sold
because of the competition from meats such as pork and mutton. Thus,
competition of domestic pork and mutton with domestic manufacturing
beef appears to be just as important, or even more so, then competition
with imported manufacturing beef. The average price received by farmers
for beef cattle per hundred pounds has remained quite steady since the
1957-58 period, when imports of beef made their first really big increase,
Prices rose from $15.00 in 1956 and $17.20 in 1957 to $22.00 in 1958
and $22.70 in 1959. Since that time, prices per" hundred weight of beef
cattle have remained relatively constant. In 1962, they were $21,30 per
hundredweight.^
Much the same is true of the price of canner and cutter cows.
In 1957, 100 pounds sold for $11.96. In 1958, the price rose to $16.47.
In 1962, the average annual price for canner and cutter cows was about
2
40 percent higher than the 1953-55 average.
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for cattlemen
to prove that they have been seriously affected by imports of beef and
veal. However, it would be equally difficult for those favoring imports
to prove that imports of manufacutring beef have had no adverse effects
on the United States beef cattle industry. It must be remembered that
if United States cattlemen increase their rate of slaughter of cull
cows in the future, then competition with foreign importers will be
very real and harmful to their sales. Such a situation would result
in a lowering of domestic prices for processing beef and consequently
less income to the United States cattlemen.
The question must be asked whether or not such imports can be
expected to continue. Will foreign suppliers by able to export such
large quantities to the United States indefinitely? An answer to this
United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Meat
Products Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, "Beef and Veal: U.S,
Production, Imports and Exports (Carcass Weight), and Cattle Prices,
1952-1962," June 4, 1963.
United States Tariff Commission, "Average Prices for Cov7s and
Steers in the United States, 1953-62," Tariff Schedules of the United
States Annotated (1963). Washington D.C., April 1963, p. 32.
(juestlon is difficult to jive, but it is to be expected that Australia,
New Zealand and Ireland will be able to continue to supply the United
States at this same rate, and at the same time satisfy demands in their
European markets. It must be concluded that continued heavy imports
of boneless beef are to be expected. Cow prices per hundredweight may
fall somewhat, but this would not be a retarding factor on imports. It
would take a considerable drop in cow prices to cause a drop in im
ports.
The European Economic Community and United States Imports
of Cattle and Beef Cattle Products
Really, the key question is whether or not world trade patterns
will continue in the future as they have in the past, Uill the Common
Market, for example, continue in the future to import from Argentina,
Denmark, Ireland and Oceania? If not, that is, if imports of these
commodities are restricted by the new common agricultural policy, how
much of the surplus of beef and beef cattle products of these countries
will be redirected to the United States?
And assuming that the United Kingdom joins the Common Market and
restricts imports of beef from Australia and New Zealand, how much of
this high-quality beef and veal v;ould instead be sent to the United
States, and what would this mean to cattlemen in terms of markets and
prices? Argentina is not expected to increase exports of beef and veal
greatly, but it is anticipated that exports from Australia and New
Zealand will increase rapidly, and that these countries and many other
world suppliers vjill not be unwilling or unable to fill Argentina's
traditional markets, and still have much other beef to export. However,
a detailed discussion of future United States imports as a result of
Common Market agricultural policies must be left for consideration in
later chapters.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF CATTLE AND BEEF CATTLE PRODUCTS
Exports of agricultural products have Increased greatly since
the pre-Uorld War II era. In 1939, United States agricultural exports
totaled $655,000,000. The 1962 calendar year agricultural exports,
on the other hand, amounted to more than $5,000,000,000.^ Even allow
ing for the decreased value of the dollar in this period, the increase
has been enormous. The reason for this great increase and for the fact
that so many other countries find it in their interest to import agri
cultural goods from the United States is the great efficiency of the
United States farmers. Yet, just as United States agricultural pro
duction has become extremely efficient, so is this true of United States
industrial production. Because of this, traditional importers of
United States agricultural goods, mainly the industrialized nations of
Western Europe, have found it increasingly difficult to export their
industrial goods to the United States in return for imports of agricul
tural imports from the United States. Therefore, they seek to increase
their trade with relatively underdeveloped nations. United States may
be faced with increasing competition in the future because of this.
This is one of the reasons why European nations may follow a policy of
restricting United States imports. Another reason is that they want to
U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade by Commodities Calendar Year
1962, op. cit., p. 2.
provide protection for their politically important farmers* Their con
cern, of course, is mainly with feed grain imports. But the future
policy of Europe, and the Common Market in particular, will affect the
United States cattlemen.
In the nineteenth century, with the rapid expansion of grazing
area in the United States, more beef was available than could be con
sumed and thus the United States became a net exporter of beef and beef
products. However, with the settling of the West and the increased
urbanization of the tx/entieth century, domestic consumption caught up
with the domestic production of beef cattle, and as a result, the trend
became one of increasing imports of beef cattle and beef cattle products.
The United States has now been a net importer of beef and beef products
for several decades.
Trade in cattle and beef cattle products in the nineteenth cen
tury and the early part of the twentieth century was necessarily limited
because of the difficulty of shipping fresh meat and beef products
without having them spoil. With the introduction of improved packing
and shipping facilities, however, world trade in these products has ex
panded enormously. Newer and better methods are still being invented
and thus permitting even greater amounts to be cheaply and safely
shipped. Because of this, it can be expected that in the future, ex
ports of beef and veal, and beef products in canned and refrigerated
form v/ill be much more common. In Chapter II, it was shown that in
1961 almost a million metric tons of beef and veal alone were exported.
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Three countries. New Zealand, Argentina and Australia accounted for
over one-half of all world exports.
The United States, according to figures in Table 3 exported
only one-half of one percent of total world exports of beef and veal.
This is indeed an insignificant share, yet the United States does have
a considerable export business in beef products.
Table 6 gives a summary of the principal cattle and beef cattle
products exported from the United States in 1^62. The two commodities
which accounted for most United States impofts oi cattle and beef
products, namely beef and veal and live cattle, are comparatively
small export items.
As in Chapter III, it will be essential to consider each com
modity exported separately, to determine its relative importance among
cattle and beef cattle products exported and to discover its principal
destinations. Only by so doing will it be possible to determine how
much United States cattlemen will be affected by a policy change of
such economic bloc as the Common Market. It should be pointed out that
the quantities and values of all commodities discussed in this chapter,
including variety meats, canned meats and oils, fats and greases, come
only from beef sources. As in the preceding chapters, the study in
this chapter will begin with cattle and calves.
United States Exports of Cattle and Calves
When it is considered that the United States in 1962 imported
over 1,000,000 cattle and calves and that only 19,000 head of cattle
were exported in that same year, it must be concluded that for a country
with the second largest number of cattle, imports were inordinately
large, and exports singularly small. However, it should be remembered
that cattle were imported mainly by farmers who wished to get light
cattle so that they could be fed, fattened and then sold for beef.
Opportunities for United States ranchers of selling their lean cattle
to be fattened to foreign producers are few. VJhat the United States
does export then is cattle for breeding purposes. Foreign producers
of beef are willing to import cattle from the United States to strengthen
the quality of their cattle stocks.
Most exports of breeding cattle go to Mexico. In 1962, Mexico
imported 10,856 of the 18,039 cattle exported for breeding purposes.
In dollar terms, this amounted to $3,338,581 of the total $7,459,491
received by United States exporters of breeding cattle. Canada im
ported 1,512 head of cattle totaling almost a million dollars in sales,
and Venezuela took 1,180 head of cattle amounting to slightly over one
million dollars.
United States Exports of Beef and Veal
As is the case with cattle exports, so is it true tunt total
exports of beef and veal, amounting to 27,000,000 pounds are d'7arfed
^United States Department of Commerce, United States Exports of
Domestic and Foreign Merchandise, 1962 Annual, Washington D.C., 1963,
p. 12.
by the 948,000,000 pounds product weight imported by the United States
in 1962. In carcass weight equivalent, exports equaled 32,000,000
pounds. The 1962 figure, it will be remembered from Chapter
III, was 16,311,000,000 pounds. This means that 0.19 percent of all
United States production of beef and veal was exported. This hardly
compares v;ith imports of this commodity, which was estimated to equal
8.9 percent of domestic production in 1962.
Canada was the most important United States market for beef and
veal. In 1962, Canada took 16,000,000 pounds, which is 62.4 percent
of the total 27,000,000 pounds of beef and veal exported by the United
States. Most of the other exports of beef and veal went to the
Carribean area.^ It should be noted that if Australia and New Zealand
are forced out of the EEC market or lose much of their sales in Western
Europe, they V7ill certainly concentrate on the Canadian as well as the
United States market. If this v;ere the case, they might undersell the
United States in its traditional markets, and thus adversely affect
United States cattlemen, and also increase competition for United
States producers by increasing exports to the United States. This, of
course, is true for Argentina as well. If Argentine exports were kept
out of Europe, it would look to its powerful Alliance for Progress
partner to take increased purchases of Argentine beef and veal, and
thereby help it out of a difficult economic situation.
^Ibid., pp. 12-13.
T^le 6 shows that $92,000 in beef and veal were exported to
the Common Market, This equaled only 0.73 percent of all United
States exports of this commodity. Exports to the United Kingdom
amounted to $229,000 which was 1,8 percent of United States exports,
United States Exports of Variety Meats
United States variety meats, also known in world trade terms
as "edible offals" do not find great demand in foreign countries.
United States exports in the 1962 calendar year of variety meats
totaled only $13,301,000. Variety meats include much of what in
Chapter III was referred to as manufacturing meats, such as sausages,
bologna and frankfurters. The most popular single variety meat item
proved to be beef tongues. Exports of beef tongues in 1962 were
valued at $8,956,000 and comprised approximately two-thirds of total
variety meat exports.
Western Europe dominates the market for this category of ex
ports. In 1962, of the 125,000,000 pounds exported, 116,700,000 pounds
were taken by Western Europe, and 83,000,000 pounds by the Common Mar
ket alone. The EEC thus accounted for 66.4 percent of all United
States exports ofvariety meats and Western Europe took 93.3 percent
of United States variety tnsats exports.^ In terms of value, the Common
^United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Meat
Products Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, March 19, 1963.
Market's share, $8,553,000, amounted to 64.3 percent of United States
exports and the United Kingdom's $3,678)000 equaled 27.7 percent.
Thus the EEC and the United Kingdcr.1 together imported 92.0 percent of
United States exports of variety meats. Within the EEC, Western
Germany and the Netherlands were the most important importers. France
also took a considerable amount of United States variety meats.
United States Exports of Oils, Fats and Greases
"Oils, fats and greases" is United States' most important cattle
and beef cattle products export item. Exports of this consist almost
entirely of inedible tallow. This category accounted for approximately
45 percent of all United States cattle and beef cattle products exported
in 1962. The average yearly value of tallow and greases exports in
the five year period 1935-39 was $1,108,000. By 1962, exports of in
edible tallow alone amounted to $93,311,000, of which $88,151,000 was
tallow from cattle sources. Tallow exports have increased so greatly
for several reasons. First of all, there is a greater rate of cattle
slaughter in the United States than ever before. This means that there
is more tallov7 available and that the surplus production is larger.
The more fundamental reason, however, is that the uses to which tallow
had been put in the past in the United States have been replaced by
cheaper substitutes. For example, tallow used in soaps has been greatly
decreased because of the increasing popularity of synthetic detergents.
As a result, United States prices of tallow have fallen.
Foreign buyers have taken advantage of this low price level for United
States tallow, and because of this. United States exports have in
creased.
The European Economic Community has proven to be the largest
United States Market for tallow exports. In the 1962 calendar year,
imports by the EEC accounted for $17,852,000, or 30 percent of the
United States exports of tallow. Italy and the Netherlands were the
two most important EEC importers of united States tallow and together
made up 77 percent of United States exports to the Community. The
United Kingdom imported over one million dollars worth of United States
tallow in 1962. Western Europe in 1962 took 44 percent of United
States exports of tallow.
However, the United States faces competition from two countries
in Western Europe in this commodity. One, the United Kingdom, as
stated above, is a customer of the United States for this item, and
the other, France, is a member of the EEC, which is the United States'
best customer. Certainly, if the EEC and Western Europe attempt to
increase their cattle production, and that is their aim, they will have
increased amounts of tallow, and the United States will be cut out of
a very lucrative market for its tallow.
Outside of Western Europe, Japan has been the United States'
best customer. In 1962, Japan imported $13,276,000 in beef tallow from
the United States.^ This amounted to 9 percent of total United States
tallow exports. Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and other countries In
the Middle and Far East, plus Canada and Latin American countries were
other markets for United States exports of tallow and greases. It Is
expected that In the future, the United States will be able to develop
expanded markets In many of these areas for Its tallow exports.
United States Exports of Hides and Skins
Cattle hides and calf and kip skins were the second most Impor
tant United States export commodity. Exports of hides and skins In
1962 totaled $73,257,000 In dollar terms. This equaled 36.4 percent
of all United States exports of cattle and beef products. Total exports
of hides and skins and tallow and greases amounted to 81 percent of
United States exports of cattle and beef cattle products In 1962.
The United States and Argentina have traditionally dominated
world exports of this commodity, and usually make up over 60 percent
of total world exports.^ It Is almost certain, however, that the
future will bring greater exports from Australia, New Zealand, Canada
and South Africa, and provide much stlffer competition for the ' Big
Two" in bovine hides and skins exports.
lUnited States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise,
Annual, 0£. clt., p. 33.
^John W. Thompson, Marketing Economics Division, Economic ^search
Service, "Hide Outlook for 1963," Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-
128, U.S.D.A., Washington D.C,, January 1963.
An examination of the destinations of United States hides and
skins exports is essential. This will shov7 in which markets of the
world the United States will face increased competition in the future.
Table 6 shows that in terms of value, the EEC took $17,852,000 of the
total $73,257,000 v7orth of United States hides and skins export^.
The EEC thus imported 24.4 percent of United States exports of these
products. The United Kingdom imported only $495,000 in hides and skins
from the United States, a mere 0.7 percent of total United States ex
ports. Switzerland, the only other VJestern European importer of United
States hides and skins, took an even smaller sum in terms of value.
Western Europe accounts for about one-quarter of United States exports
of bovine hides and skins.
Japan is the most important among the other world importers of
United States hides and skins. In 1962, Japan took 717,000 pieces,
which was equal to 40.5 percent of United States exports of hides and
skins. Other important markets for United States include Canada, which
took approximately 10 percent and Mexico which took about 5 percent of
United States exports of this commodity in 1962.^
Effects of Exports of Cattle and Beef Cattle Products
on the United States Beef Cattle Industry
Though exports of cattle and beef cattle products are not as
great in value as are imports of these same commodities, yet the export
^United States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise,
1962 Annual, op. cit., p. 24.
market is important to United States cattlemen and to the United States
agricultural trade. Exports amounting to $201,551,000 are hardly in
significant, especially when it is considered that these exports are
principally surplus items. These exports have undoubtedly acted to
increase the domestic price of beef cattle, just as imports have tended
to act as a depressant on domestic prices. To state which of the two,
exports or imports, has a greater impact on United States beef cattle
prices Is at this point impossible. Such conclusions could not be
reached without a very thorough and competent statistical study. It
is simply the purpose here to indicate that exports as well as imports
do affect the United States beef cattle prices. As has been shov7n in
Chapters III and IV, the value of imports is greater than the value of
United States exports of cattle and beef cattle products, but to con
clude because of this that trade in these products hurts the United
States beef cattle industry, and to make estimations of the amounts in
dollar terms by whcch the industry is affected would be sheer folly.
Among the markets of the world for United States exports of
cattle and beef cattle products, the EEC is very important. Its total
imports of $53,303,000 were, in 1962, approximately 30 percent of total
United States exports of these commodities. The United Kingdom, which
took $5,919,000 in beef cattle products from the United States accounted
for almost 3 percent of United States cattle and beef cattle products
exports. Thus, while other European countries import very little beef
or beef cattle products in terms of value or quantity from the United
States, Western Europe as a whole nevertheless imports over one-third
of total United States exports of these commodities.
Outside of Europe, markets in Central and South America, Canada,
Japan and other Asian countries are important for United States exports
of cattle and beef cattle products. Increased competition for these
products is expected. There is also the possibility of more protection
ist policies in Western Europe, and the Common Market in particular.
With increased self-sufficiency in these products in the Common Market
and Western Europe, it will be of no little importance to United
States cattlemen for United States governmental and private organiza
tions to develop nex7 markets in other areas of the x^/orld, and to remain
competitive in export prices vjith other i^orld exporters of cattle and
beef cattle products.
Asian countries will undoubtedly assume increasing importance
in the future. At the moment, Japan is far and away the most important
market for United States beef products exports in Asia. There is good
reason to believe that this market x^ill continue to grow. Markets will
be sought by United States exporters and by the United States Depart
ment of Agriculture (U.S.D.A.) representatives in other Asian countries
as they proceed to progress in their economic development. Private
exporting groups and producers are now x-7orking with the U.S.D.A. to
advertise United States exports in countries throughout the x-zorld.
These commodities are being promoted in Asia and Latin America as x^ell
as in Europe. Only by such vigorous salemanship can the United States
Groul
Table 7. United States Exports of Feed Grains to Present and
Potential Members of the EEC, Value by Country
and Group, Calendar Years, 1957-611
Year 1957-61 Percent
Million dollars
Present meinbers 108.7 163.8 245.8 203.3 195.0 183.3
Potential members^ 115.1 135.6 192.3 174.0 144.4 152.5
Present & potential
members 223.8 300.4 438.1 377.3 339.4 336.0
Other countries 124.2 164.4 115.5 136.5 177.1 143.5
38.6
32.1
All countrie
70.7
29.3
100.0
"'•Compiled from official records, U. S. Bureau of Census.
^Present members include the Six plus Greece as associate.
^Potential members include Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United
Kingdom as full member applicants; Austria, Sweden and Switzerland
as applicants for association only; and Spain and Turkey as appli
cants for association.
Source: Robert L, Tontz and Alex D, Angelidis, "U.S. Agricultural
Trade with the Common Market," Foreign Agricultural Trade of
the United States. United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, October 1962, p. 8.
expect to retain, much less Increase, Its share of world exports of
cattle and beef cattle products.
United States Exports of Feed Grains
It will be of value to brlefly examine present exports of feed
grains from the United States and the destinations of these feed grains.
Table 7 gives a summary of United States exports of feed grains. It
shows that the 1957-61 exports of feed grains by the United States
averaged $475,300,000 annually. Of this amount, the EEC took 38.6
percent. Present and potential members, which include most of Western
Europe, took $336,000,000 x^orth of United States feed grains. This was
70.7 percent of all United States feed grain exports. In quantity, of
the four feed grains exported (corn, barley, sorghums and oats), corn
is the most important, and accounted in 1961 for 66.9 percent of total
bushels of United States feed grain exports.^
Foreign sales of feed grains are very important to the farraers
of the United States. They accounted for 29 percent of all 1961 feed
grain sales by United States farmers. Further, United States exports
of feed grains in 1961 v;ere 53 percent of the feed grains exported by
2
the nations of the v7orld.
These feed grain exports have expanded as livestock industries
developed abroad. The Common Market farmers will in the future proba
bly stress increased beef production, since demands for beef in the
EEC is grov/ing rapidly. If they are to be efficient in their beef
production, they x^ill have to get feed grains from the United States,
for feed grains produced by the Common Market countries are much higher
priced. Hox^ever, it may be the policy of the Common Market to become
more self sufficient in feed grain production. This x-jould mean that
Harry Hukins, Assistant Secretary, Surge Corporation, Nex-7 York
City, before the 11th National Agricultural Credit Conference Sponsored
by the Agricultural Committee of the American Bankers Association,
Omaha, Nebraska, November 12, 1962, p. 5,
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser
vice, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U.S.D.A.^
Washington D.C,, January 1963, p. 49.
feed grains X70uld be excluded from the Common Market, and since it is
unlikely that the United States could build up in the near future any
other world market for feed grains to take the place of the Common
Market, surpluses of feed grains would accrue, and the inevitable fall
in United States feed grain prices would result.
As explained before in this study, this x^ould not necessar ily
be a good thing for cattlemen, for the cost of pork and poultry produc
tion which relies to a much greater degree on feed grains, would de
crease relative to the cost of beef production, and these meats would
become more competitive with beef.
At the same time, because of lox^er feed grain prices, many
farmers X70uld move out of feed grain production and into livestock
production. Land formerly used for feed grains would be used as pas
ture land. Numbers of all livestock, including cattle, could bo ex
pected to increase, and this t^ould tend to lower beef prices. Further
more, if this same thing occurred in the major beef exporting countries,
it might happen that the United States would find itself with more
imported beef and veal than ever before. This would be another thing
which would adversely affect the United States cattlemen.
Therefore, in the following chapters, close attention must be
given to the future of United States trade, and especially on the
effects that the various possible Common Market policies might have on
United States exports of feed grains, and the subsequent effects on
the beef cattle industry in the United States, and in South Dakota.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH DAKOTA BEEF CATTLE IN THE NATIONAL
BEEF CATTLE INDUSTRY, AND IN THE SOUTH DAKOTA ECONOMY
South Dakota can be split into two almost equal parts by the
Missouri River, which flows from North Dakota in a southerly direction
across the state. The land to the east of the river was covered by
ice during the glacial period, while that to the west of the river was
not. Because of this, soils in the two areas differ. Land east of
the river is generally better than the more barren land to the west.
Also, the area in South Dakota to the west of the Missouri River has
less rainfall. Thus it is suited to cattle and other livestock grazing.
The more fertile land to the east of the river, receives more rainfall
and as a result is used primarily for grain and hay production for
livestock feeding.
Because of the topography and climatic conditions in the state,
the production of cattle for beef is common throughout South Dakota.
Cattle ranches on which cattle graze freely most of the year are found
in the western part of the state. These cattle are fed only during the
very coldest part of the winter. In the eastern part of the state,
cattle are bought and fed by farmers x^ho have used their land to grow
grains and hay to fatten these cattle and then to sell them for beef.
Cattle feeding has become progressively more important. It is now
estimated that approximately 12,000 of the 56,000 farms in the state
1
are engaged in cattle feeding.
It is the purpose of this chapter to come to a more precise
knowledge of the magnitude of the role played by South Dakota beef cat
tle in the United States beef cattle industry. This will allow an
estimate of the effects on South Dakota cattlemen, of policy changes
in the Common Market which will affect the United States beef cattle
industry.
An examination of what would be the result on the South Dakota
economy as a i/hole of changes in the fortunes of South Dakota cattle
men will be another goal of this chapter. In order to be in a posi
tion to make such an evaluation, it will be essential to determine the
importance of South Dakota beef cattle production to the South Dakota
economy. Such an analysis will reflect the influence of changing world
trade in cattle and beef cattle products on the entire population of
the state of South Dakota rather than on just one segment of the state's
population, the cattlemen.
The Importance of South Dakota Beef Cattle in the Beef
Cattle Industry of the United States
The number of beef cattle in the state of South Dakota, as is
true of the United States as a whole, has been growing rapidly due to
A Century of South Dakota Livestock, op. cit., pp. 6 and 55.
the growing population in the country and the ever increasing demand
for beef. However, the rate of increase in beef cattle numbers in
South Dakota has been even greater than that in the country. This in
crease in South Dakota has been especially noticeable since the end of
the Second World War,
In 1945, of the total 2,610,000 cattle on South Dakota farms,
1,746,000 were beef cattle (cattle not for milk) and 864,000 were cat
tle which were kept for milk production. However, by January 1, 1962,
only 413,000 of the 3,460,000 cattle and calves in the state were dairy
cattle, while 3,047,000 were beef cattle and calves,^
On January 1, 1963, of the 3,738,000 cattle and calves recorded
on South Dakota farms, beef cattle and calf numbers had grown to
3,347,000 and dairy cattle numbers had dropped to 391,000, Numbers of
beef cattle in the state rose from January 1, 1962 to January 1, 1963
by 9.8 percent.2
South Dakota has traditionally ranked high among states in pro
duction of beef cattle. In total numbers of beef cattle and calves.
South Dakota ranked sixth in 1963, behind Texas, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas
and Oklahoma, with the aforementioned number of 3,347,000, Considering
Century of South Dakota Livestock, op, cit,^. p, 13,
^South Dakota Agriculture 1962, op, cit,, p, 28,
beef ccMs two years and over, South Dakota ranked fifth among states
in the union v;ith 1,399,000.^
On January 1, 1963, according to statistics compiled by the
U.S.D.A., there were 103,800,000 head of cattle in the United States.
This record number was four percent higher than the 1962 figure of
99,500,000 head of cattle and calves. As in South Dakota, the number
in the United States kept for milk production dropped from the 1962
figure of 29,1100,000 head to the figure of 28,000,000 head in 1963, a
reduction of 2,7 percent. The number kept for beef, on the other hand,
increased by six percent to 74,300,000 head of cattle from the 1962
figure of 70,500,000. The number of cattle kept for beef in the United
2
States has increased since 1958 by 26 percent.
On January 1, 1963, therefore. South Dakota had 4.5 percent of
the nation's total number of beef cattle. In thel956-60 period, it
claimed only 4.1 percent of the nation's total beef cattle numbers.
It is estimated by Dr. Rex Helfinstine of the Economics Department,
South Dakota State College, that by 1970, South Dakota will have at
least 4.5 percent of the nation's beef cattle numbers, and possibly more.
'Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-129, cit., p. 25,
Ibid., p. 1.
^In a private discussion with Dr. Rex D. Helfinstine, Professor,
Economics Department, South Dakota State College, October, 1963.
While it is true that about 4,5 percent of the nation's numbers
of beef cattle and calves are found in South Dakota, this does not
give a fully realistic estimate of the importance of South Dakota to
the nation's beef cattle industry. The reason for this is that a
disproportionate number of the state's total beef cattle are grazing
cattle found on ranches. These cattle are lighter in weight than are
cattle on feed, and are often sold to feeders for fattening before
being slaughtered. Thus the amount of cash income for each one of
these animals is not as great as is that derived from the heavier fed
cattle. The importance of South Dakota in the nation's beef cattle
industry is not as great as the 4.5 percentage figure would suggest.
It will therefore be necessary to compute a more exact figure, and this
can be done by finding the proportion of total national cash income from
the sale of beef cattle and calves which is made up by South Dakota beef
cattle and calf sales.
The average yearly gross cash income figure for the four year
period 1958-61 in South Dakota from the sale of beef cattle and calves
V7as $280,662,000.^ The average yearly gross income for the sale of
beef cattle and calves in the nation in this same time period was
2$7,525,000,000. Therefore, South Dakota's proportion of the national
South Dakota Agriculture 1962. op. cit.. p. 47.
'Livestock and Meat Situation. LMS-131, cit.. p. 21.
income from beef cattle and calf sales was about 3.7 percent. It is
to be expected that, because of the anticipated faster rate of growth
in cattle numbers in the state of South Dakota than in the nation, and
the increased popularity in this state of feeding cattle, the receipts
from sales of South Dakota beef cattle and calves in the year 1970 will
equal approximately 4.0 percent of national sales.
Based on expected increases in cattle numbers, the value of beef
cattle and calves in the nation for the 1970 period can be computed in
present United States dollars. Then, on the assumption that South
Dakota will have a 4.0 percent share of national cash receipts for the
sale of beef cattle and calves, the value of beef cattle sales in South
Dakota can be estimated.
According to this line of reasoning, and by using a logarithmic
method of computation, it x-zas computed that national cash receipts for
cattle and calves V7ill increase from the 1958-62 five year average of
$7,649,000,000 to approximately $11,266,000,000 in 1970. If South
Dakota cattlemen take 4.0 percent of the national receipts for the sale
of beef cattle and calves, they X7ill get in 1970, an approximate gross
figure of $450,640,000 from these sales.^ Considering that the 195C-
61 average gross income for cattle and calves in South Dakota V7as
$280,662,750, the projected figure appears to be quite reasonable.
This assumes continued inflation, and the fact that more farm
ers will be in the cattle feeding business by 1970. It cannot therefore
be expected that all these increases will go to present ranchers and
feeders of their heirs.
Future Production and Consumption of Beef and Veal
The demand for beef has increased in the past for various
reasons. One obviojs reason is the yearly increase in population. As
the numbers of consumers increase, it is to be expected that consumption
of beef vjill increase. Population trends of the past in the United
States are expected to continue, though at perhaps a slightly decreased
rate, to 1970. Another important factor influencing consumption of
beef and veal is the level of personal Incomes. The trend in incomes
has been upvjard since the end of the Second World War, and it is ex
pected to continue, as is shown in Table C, in this same upward direc
tion in the future.
Per capita civilian consumption of beef and veal in the 19A7-49
period was 75.3 pounds. By the 1957-59 period, it had increased to
1
89.2 pounds. Per capita consumption in 1963 jinnped to 96.2 pounds.
According to projections of the U.G.D.A., and also by the author, con-
2
sumption of beef and veal in 197C \rill be approximately 100.4 pounds.
The oopulation of the United States in the year 1970, according to one
3
study made by the Population Reference Bureau, will be 210,140,000.
^South Dahota Agriculture 1962, op. cit., p. 38.
^United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Ser
vice, A Profile of Agriculture Pro^ected to 1960, U.S.D.A., Washington
D.C., November 19C3, p. 4.
^Population Reference Bureau Inc., Population Bulletin, Vol. XV,
No. 3, May 1959, p. 54.
This assumes an annual growth rate of 1.56 percent. Projected 1570
consumption of beef and veal therefore is 22,779,176,000 pounds. Pro
duction in 1970 is expected to be around 20,000,000,000 pounds. Thus
import requirements will be larger than the 1,445,000,000 pounds im
ported in 1962, but it may be expected that increased requirements will
be easily met by the anticipated growth in production in the major beef
exporting nations of the world.
The Importance of Beef Cattle in the South Dakota Economy
There are several possible uays of determining the importance
of beef cattle to South Dakota. The percentage of the working popula
tion of the state involved in beef cattle production could be computed.
However, this V70uld not give nearly as accurate an estimate of the part
played by beef cattle in the economy of South Dakota as v;ould a measure
of the cash farm incomes from the sales of cattle and calves relative
to the total personal cash incomes in the state. This latter method
will therefore be used.
A computation of the importance of beef cattle to the South
Dakota economy is necessary so that the effect on the South Dakota
economy resulting from changes in the international patterns of trade
in cattle and beef cattle products can later be measured. It can be
^In a private discussion V7ith Dr. Donald Erickson, Assistant
Professor, Economics Department, South Dakota State College.
Table C. Personal Incomes in South Dakota by Major Sources,
1951-55 Average, 1956-60 Average, 1961, and
Projections to 1970
1951-55
Averane
millions of dollars - - - -
1,092 1,294 1,050Personal incomes 876
Wages & salary disbursements 409 520 646
Farms 27 23 21
Mining 9 12 12
Contract construction 31 45 57
Manufacturing 33 53 68
Wholesale & retail price 100 100 144
Finance, ins. & real estate 15 21 26
Transportation 22 27 31
Comms. 6c pub. utilities 14 22 25
Services 42 53 65
Government 110 243 165
Other industries 1 1 1
Other labor income nO 15 20
Proprietors income 334 369 4oO
Farm 235 238 238
Won-farm 93 131 162
Property income 90 137 164
Transfer payments 45 75 99
Less: personal contributions
for social insurance IIJ 23 34
Total net farm income as a
percent of total personal
income in South Dakota .'26.33 21.79 18 13.25
There has been considerable variation in farm income in South Dakota
since the end of VJorld War II so that it is extremely difficult to
make a farm income projection to 1970 with any great degree of cer
tainty .
Source: University of South Dakota, South Dakota Economic and Business
Abstract^ 1939-1962^ Bulletin Number 79, Business Research
Bureau, School of Business, University of South Dalcota,
Vermillion, South Dakota, June 1963, pp. 73-79.
noted in Table 8, that although personal incomes in the state rose
considerably between the 1951-55 and 1956-60 average periods, farm
incomes rose only slightly. The rise in personal incomes in the state
\i7as about 25 percent, while the rise in the farmers* incomes rose
little more than one percent. Assuming that conditions in the future
will continue as they have in the past, the trend for net farm incomes
as a percentage of total personal net incomes in the state will con
tinue dovjnward. By use of logarithmic equations, it was projected that
in the year 1970, total state personal,net incomes will equal
$1,850,000,000. Net farm incomes V7ere projected to be approximately
$245,000,000 in 1970, V7hich is 13.25 percent of the total projected
state income.
Table 9. South Dakota Cash Farm Incomes in Percent by Commodities,
1951-55 Average, 1956-60 Average, 1961, and Projections to 1970
Feed grains
Corn
Oats
Barley
Sorghum grains
Total feed grains
Cattle and calves
1951-55
Average
1956-60
Average 1961
- - -percent - -
Projections for 1970 are based on estimates made by Dr. Rex Helfinstine.
Economics Department, South Dakota State College.
Figures for cattle and calves do not include dairy products.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, South Dakota Agricul
ture 1962, Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Washington
D.C., 1963.
Now it is necessary to consider the importance of beef cattle
in South Dakota agriculture. This is shown in Table 9. According to
Table 9, the role played by cattle and calves in the South Dakota
agricultural economy increased from 33.6 percent in the 1951-55 period
to 42.8 percent of cash farm incomes in South Dakota in the 1956-60
period. The importance of cattle and calves in the agricultural
economy of South Dakota has therefore been definitely on the increase.
It has been estimated that by 1970, cattle and calves will account for
approximately 50 percent of the farm cash incomes in the state.
By using the data from Tables C and 9 further computations can
be made. In the 1951-55 period, 26.83 percent of the total personal
incomes in South Dakota V7ere farm incomes. At the same time, 33.6 per
cent of cash farm incomes in the state came from cattle and calves.
Therefore, it can be concluded thac the sale of cattle and calves
accounted for nine percent of total personal net incomes in the state,
in the 1951-55 period. In this same manner, it is computed that in
the 1956-60 period, cash farm incomes from the sale of cattle and calves
accounted for 9.3 percent of total personal incomes in South Dakota,
and in the year 1961, it made up 7.7 percent of total personal incomes
in the state. According to the 1970 projection figures, the sale of
cattle and calves V7ill make up approximately 6.7 percent of total per
sonal net incomes in the state which v/ill amount to approximately
$1,850,000,000 in 1970. Under these conditions cattle sales V70uld
amount to about $124,000,000 net income in 1970,
Thus it may be concluded that beef cattle are really Important
to the South Dakota economy. It does not take a great deal of per
spicacity to recognize that if the beef cattle industry of South Dakota
is adversely affected by changing trade patterns, the economy of South
Dakota as a v7hole vould suffer as V7ell, both directly and indirectly.
In this same manner, the importance of feed grains in the state
economy can be computed. In the 1951-55 period, feed grains comprised
3.9 percent of total personal incomes. In 1956-60, they accounted for
2.6 percent, and in 1961, they made up 2,0 percent of total personal
incomes in the state. In the year 1970, based on projections made,
incomes from the sale of feed grains will comprise 1.33 percent of
total personal incomes in South Dakota. Of course, this shows that the
sale of feed grains is not nearly as important to the economy of South
Dakota as are cattle and calves, but nevertheless, attention must be
given to them because, as previously mentioned, the future Common Market
policy could affect United States exports of feed grains greatly, and
this in turn would have corresponding efffects on the price of cattle,
and thus on the incomes of United States cattlemen.
The Relationship Betv7ccn Feed Grains and Beef
South Dakota, in the 1956-60 period, produced 2.9 percent of the
nation's output of corn, 7.1 percent of the nation's oats, and 3.5 per
cent of the United States' barley. Corn production is expected to in
crease from the 1956-60 level of 3,862,000,000 bushels to 4,554,000,000
bushels in 1970. National production of oats is projected to decrease
slightly from the 1,220,000,000 bushels to 1,132,415,000 bushels in
1970, while production of barley, it is projected, will remain at
approximately the same level as that of 1956-60 when 425,956,000
bushels were produced. Since South Dakota will continue to produce
approximately the same percentage of national production of each of
these feed grains, according to studies made by the Economics Depart
ment, South Dakota State College, it may be concluded that by 1970
South Dakota will have sufficient feed grain production, as V7ell as
ample hay production, to feed a significant increase in state cattle
1
numbers.
Feed grains are quite widely used for feeding cattle, and be
cause of this, affect the price of cattle and beef. However, it should
be noted that feed grains play a much more important role in the pro
duction of hogs and poultry than they do in beef cattle production.
When the prices of feed grains rise, the costs of hog and poultry pro
duction become relatively higher than those of beef cattle. Thus, if
the expansion of hogs and poultry is checked by increasing feed grain
prices, this will usually have a favorable impact on beef cattle pro
ducers, for competition from these other re^ meats and poultry will be
lessened. If the supply of these meats whose production requires much
Rex D, Uelfinstine, Trends in Farm Production, (unnumbered
mimeographed pamphlet), Economics Department, South Dakota State Col
lege, September 3.963, pp. 6-21.
feed grains is decreased, it follovjs that the demand for beef, which
does not require so much feed grain inputs, V7ill be increased. Thus,
while higher feed grain prices increase the price of beef somewhat, the
increase is not nearly as great relatively as the increase in the price
of the most inportant competing meats, and as a result, the demand for
beef will increase and beef producers will profit. It should be noted
as v;ell that the price of cattle on feed V7ill rise relative to the price
of grazing cattle.
Therefore, it is to the advantage of beef producers to have no
surplus of feed grains in the country, so that a relatively high price
for feed grains V7ill prevail. If feed grain exports were limited, and
prices fell as a result of the increasing surpluses, the beef cattle
producers would be adversely affected. Under such circumstances, some
feed grain producers would cease to use their fields for feed grain
production and instead would open them up for pasture. The supply of
meat, including beef and veal, pork, mutton and poultry would be in
creased. As a result, prices X70uld fall. The elasticity of demand for
beef has been estimated by Dr. George Mehren of the University of
California at -.G, which means that an increase in supply of .8 percent
would be accompanied by one percent decline in price. Since cheaper
feed grains v7ould have much more of an inducement for increased pork
George Mehren, Professor, University of California, "Compara
tive Costs of Agricultural Price Supports," American Economics Review,
Vol. XLI, May 1951, p. 2.
and poultry production that it would for beef, their prices would fall
more than those of beef, and cattle producers would be hurt. At the
farm level, the cross-elasticity of hogs to beef has been estimated by
Dr. G. E. Brandow to be -.28. This means that a change of one percent
in quantity of pork will cause an inverse change in the price of beef
of .28 percent.^ As the quantity of pork increases, its price will
fall.
South Dakota, and United States Exports and Imports of Cattle
and Beef Cattle Products
Now it is possible to see of what importance imports and exports
are to the South Dakota cattlemen, and to the South Dakota economy.
It has been determined that South Dakota accounted for 3.7 percent of
total national farm cash incomes from beef cattle and calves, and that
it will make up approximately four percent in the year 1970. It fol-
lov7s then, that South Dakota's share of total exports of cattle and
beef products in the 1958-61 period was 3.73 percent and that it V7as
at least that amount in 1962. Since total exports of cattle and beef
products in 1962 amounted to $201,551,000, it may be concluded that
South Dakota's share of total exports of cattle and beef cattle products
is approximately $7,518,000. Over seven and one"half million dollars
^G. E. Brandow, Interrelations Among Demands for Farm Products
and Implications for Control of Market Supply, the Pennsylvania State
University, College of Agriculture, Agricultural Experiment Station,
University Park, Pennsylvania, Interregional Publication for the State
Agricultural Experiment Stations, Bulletin 680, August 1961, p. 65.
came to South Dakota cattlemen because of the exportation of what
otherwise would have been surplus products.
Since cash receipts by cattlemen in South Dakota in this same
1956-60 period averaged $280,662,000, the computed South Dakota share,
$7,517,000.00 equaled 2.7 percent of all receipts by cattlemen in the
state for cattle and calves sales.
Net cash income for the sale of cattle in the 1956-60 period
made up 9.3 percent of total personal incomes in South Dakota, cd as
a percentage of total state income, the exportation of cattle and beef
cattle products accounted for 0.25 percent of the total personal in
comes in the state.
This would perhaps lead to the conclusion that any change in
exports of cattle and beef products v;ill have little direct effect on
the South Dakota economy, though a serious curtailment of United States
exports of these commodities could have a definite and adverse effect
on the South Dakota cattlemen.
Hov7ever, such a conclusion v;ould be very shallov;. As discussed
in this chapter, a change in the agricultural policy of the European
Economic Community could seriously hamper exports of feed grains, and
this is turn v7ould not only have great effects on the South dakota cat
tlemen, but the effects v7ould be also keenly felt in the South Dakota
economy. First of all, it might take away as much as seven and one half
million dollars in exports from the South Dakota cattlemen. The mul
tiplier effect would mean that much more than this amount would be lost
from the total incomes in the state. Furthermore, lower feed grain
prices would mean that farmers would likely get smaller incomes, and
thus would be able to spend less in South Dakota.
Also, it must not be forgotten that future Common Market agri
cultural policies could affect imports into the United States of beef
and veal. A protectionist policy would undoubtedly adversely affect,
especially if increased imports v;ere of higher quality type, the price
of and consequently the market for beef in the United States. If
imports are restricted from the Common Market and redirected to the
United States, then the increased supply would tend to lower prices,
and South Dakota cattlemen v/ould not likely get as much for their beef
as was previously the case. It must be restated that as long as im
ports are filling a gap between domestic demand and production of beef
and veal, it is unlikely that they have a very large adverse effect on
domestic prices. However, if they increase to the point where they are
directly competing with domestic beef for the consumer's dollar, then
the adverse effects on the United States and South Dakota cattlemen
could be severe.
All these considerations concerning both imports and exports
must be taken into account before making any definite conclusions con
cerning any possible effects of the EEC on the South Dakota economy.
In the following chapters, an attempt will be made to project Common
For a definition of the "multiplier effect," see the Glossary
of Terms, Appendix A.
Market feed grain and cattle and beef cattle products requireirents in
the future, and then to make an approximation of the effects on the
United States beef cattle industry, the South Dakota cattlemen, and the
South Dakota economy. Such conclusions cannot be perfectly accurate,
but it is hoped that an approximation of the type of effects, and
possibly the degree of effects may be projected.
CHAPTER VI
THE EUROPEAN ECONO^aC COMMUNITY
Prior to the Second World War, the great European nations played
dominant roles in international affairs and events. Britain still
ruled the waves, France's land forces were widely celebrated, and out
put of industrial goods for civilian and military uses in mighty Germany
made the word "Nazi" feared if not respected in all corners of the
world.
At the close of the Second World War, the economics of these
formerly proud and powerful European nations were exhausted. Germany
was vanquished, Britain and France, though technically vietors, were
in reality losers as well. France had been occupied for years, and
its legal and legislative organs were in disarray. Britain, though
never occupied by the enemy, had put an effort of such tremendous
proportions into the war, that it had incurred crippling debts.
Hence it was that following World War II, two new super-powers,
the United States and the Soviet Union, came to dominate international
affairs, and dwarfed, by comparison, the prestige and the military and
economic potence of the individual European states. It was fratricidal
quarreling that had marred the histories and economic and social ad
vancement and progress of the individual European nations. The effects
that this war would have on the futures of these countries were uncer
tain. Surely another such war, with the inevitable refinement and
improvement ot Instrumenta of destruction would deal a fatal blow to
Western European culture and civilization.
The war-weary Jeaders of the separate European states were as
sensitive to this certainty as were the long-suffering individuals and
families which populated the European continent. Thus it was that a
speech delivered in Zurich, Switzerland in 19^6 by Winston Churchill,
urging a kind of "United States of Europe" was welcomed and echoed by
other prominent European personalities. Leaders in financial, labor
and business, as well as governmental circles worked with determination
to re-organize Europe so that the European nations would in the future
work in cooperation for common ends, and abolish the threat of a
suicidal war.
It took financial assistance mainly from United States following
the war through such programs as the Marshall Plan to rejuvinate the
economies of the European states. Then in 1948, 16 countries of Western
Europe together with the United States and Canada participated in the
founding of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
Through this organization, the European coaotries could tackle their
special problems with the advice and assistance of other members. This
organization has recently been renamed the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
This growing spirit of cooperation finally resulted, in 1950,
in what is known as the Schuman Plan. Drafted mainly by the Frenchman,
Jean Monnet, this plan envisaged the union of the coal and steel
industries of Western Europe. Six countries, including France and West
Germany accepted membership and this new organization, named the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) went into operation in 1952.
Other members were Italy and the three Benelux countries (the Nether
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg). Success in terms of increased produc
tivity and trade was almost immediate.
Encouraged by the results of such cooperation, it was decided
that Europe should have a common defense community as well. However,
this plan proved to be overly Ambitious. The French, who had suffered
defeat and humiliation from German forces since Napoleonic times be
lieved that the German soldier, once again armed, would be a threat to
European peace. As a result, the French National Assembly in 1955
failed to ratify the proposed defence community.
Yet internationally-minded leaders in Europe refused to be dis
couraged by this setback, and instead planned for an economic union for
all of Europe, with eventual political union as well. Jean Monnet quit
his position as president of the ECSC to devote his full time to this
end. In June 1955, foreign ministers of the six ECSC countries along
with representatives of other European nations attended a conference
at Messina, Italy, These men know that no European nation could ever
challenge in prestige or influence either of the two super-powers of
the day. Only as a united Western European bloc could they hope to
weild the influence in international affairs that they felt was rightly
theirs. Only through such a union would standards of living in the
European countries be quickly raised and technical progress speedily
accomplished. Such a huge new market would allow increased speciali
zation, and with it, the economies o£ mass-production.
Not all the European nations, however, were so sure that such
an idealistic union could be attained, and it was over the surrender
of sovereignty in economic and political policy that the "Sixes" and
"Sevens" began to split. Great Britain refused to be a party to such
a scheme. The six members of the ECSC, on the other hand, proceeded
with the plan, and on March 25, 1957, signed the "Treaty of Rome."
This treaty came into effect on January 1, 1958. The United Kingdom,
in 1959, under the ostensible leadership of Sweden, formed the seven
member "European Free Trade Association" (EFTA), The other five mem
bers are Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria. EFTA was
designed to be not a customs union, but merely a free trade association
in which barriers to trade in industrial goods among the members were
to be lowered.^ There would be no common external tariff to third
countries.
In 1960, the six countries which compose the Common Market had
a population of 169,000,000, a working population of 74,000,000 and
land area of 449,000 square miles. Sixteen million people, over 20 per
cent of the working population, were employed in agriculture. Approxi
mately 30,000,000 people were employed in industry and 25,000,000 in
For a definition of "customs union" see the Glossary of Terms,
Appendix A.
services. The associated counties in Africa and other places add
53,000,000 in population and 4,700,000 square miles in territory to
the Community.^ Greece, on November 1, 1962, became the first European
country to associate with the Community, Because it is relatively
less developed than the other members, it could get association status
only. This permits it to raise a tariff on EEC goods over a 12 to 22
year period, while applying the EEC common external tariff to third
countries.
Also, by the end of 1962, four other countries, Britain, Ireland,
Denmark and Norway had applied for full membership. Three others,
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, had applied for association only, in
order to preserve their neutrality, and Spain and Turkey had applied
for association much on the same basis as Greece, with the possibility
of becoming full members at a later time.
The EEC has been the fastest growing major economic area in the
Western World. Gross national product rose 53 percent in the 1953-61
period. This compares with 21 percent for the United States and 25 per
cent growth rate for the United Kingdom in this same period of time.
The EEC is the world's largest importer and the second largest exporter.
European Community Information Service, The European Community
at a Glance, Washington D, C., April 1862, p. 3,
Imports in 1961 totaled $20,^^53,000,000 and exports amounted to
$20,^24,000,000,
The Treaty of Rome
What are the aims and purposes of the Community? What are the
conditions which a country must accept in order to be a member nation?
Why could the EFTA nations not accept full membership immediately? To
answer these questions and others, it will be necessary to make an
examination of the Treaty of Rome,
Article 2 of the Treaty says.
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a
Common Market and progressively approximating the economic poli
cies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and
balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
its Member States.^
The conditions of the Community are stated in Article 3:
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the
activities of the Community shall include, under the conditions
and with the timing provided for in this Treaty:
a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties
and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation
and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with
equivalent effect;
b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and common com
mercial policy toward third countries;
c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to
the free movement of persons, services and capital;
^The European Community at a Glance, op. cit., p. 5,
^The Times, "The Treaty of Rome," The Common Market, The Times
Publishing Co,, Ltd,, London, February 1962, p, 7,
d) the inauguration of a ccnitnon agricultural policy;
e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall
not be distorted in the Common Market;
g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to
coordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy
disqualibria in their balances of payments;
h) the approximation of their respective municpal law to the
extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market;
i) the creating of a European iSocial Fund in order to improve
the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to
the raising of their standard of living;
j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank intended to
facilitate the economic expansion of the Community through the
creation of new resources; and
k) the association of overseas countries and territories with
the Community with a view to increasing trade and the pursuing
jointly their effort towards economic and social development.
Further articles provide for such things as the coordination of
economic policies to attain the objectives of the treaty, nondiscrimina-
tion of nationality, and establishment of the completed Common Market
In the course of a transitional period of 12 years. The transitional
period, it states, is to consist of three stages of four years each.
The common external tariff is to be the arithmetic mean of the
1957 external tariff levels in the four customs areas; France, West
Germany, Italy and Benelux, Actually, the external tariff for indus
trial goods is ahead of schedule. The first step, a cut of 30 percent
which was to be taken in 1962, was taken at the end of 1960, two years
ahead of schedule,
A very striking feature of the Common Market is that it has
established organs that speak on behalf of the Community as a whole
^•'The Treaty of Rome," The Common Market, op, cit,, p. 7.
rather than for the individual countries. Responsibility of members
of these organs is to the Community rather than to countries of which
these members are citizens.
The most powerful of these supra-national organs is the Permanent
Commission which is located in Brussels. It consists of nine members.
No more than two of the nine members may be from any one country. The
members are appointed by the national governments, but accept no orders
from them. These members and the Commission staff, have come to be
known as the "Eurocrats." The Commission formulates policies for the
Community, and makes recommendations on matters concerning the treaty.
On matters of great importance, it must secure the consent of the
Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers consists of representatives of the
various national governments. On matters submitted by the Commission,
the Council must vote unanimously in order to pass them. Thus each
country presently has a veto on matters of great importance. However,
after the end of the second stage, January 1, 1966, decisions will be
taken by the Council on a qualified majority, France, West Germany and
Italy will have four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands will have
two votes apiece, and Luxembourg will have one vote. Twelve votes will
be required to reach a decision.
The European Parliament is found at Strasbourg, France. One
hundred and forty-two members, appointed by the various national govern
ments meet there. At present, the Parliament has no legislative powers.
but it is envisaged that members will be elected in the future by direct
universal suffrage, and that eventually, it will legislate in the name
of the Common Market.
A Court of Justice meets to consider disputes that arise over
the Treaty, It enforces rules of the Treaty, and supports the rulings
of the Commission.
The Common Agricultural Policy
The Treaty of Rome states that there is to be a common agricul
tural policy. However, the treaty establishes only the objectives of
such a policy, and does not state what that policy should be. Rather,
it states only that a common policy for agriculture is to be worked
out by the beginning of 1962.
The objectives of the common agricultural policy are found in
Article 39 of the Treaty, and read as follows:
The common agricultural policy shall have as its objectives;
a) to increase agricultural productivity by developing technical
progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricul
tural production and the optimum utilization of the factors of
production particularly labor;
b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricul
tural population, particularly by the increasing of the individual
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture;
c) to stabilize markets;
d) to guarantee regular supplies; and
e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers.
In working out the common agricultural policy and the
special methods which it may involve, due account shall be taken
l"The Treaty of Rome," the Common Market, op. cit., p. 11.
a) the particular character of agricultural activities, arising
from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and
natural disparities between the various agricultural regions;
b) the need to make the appropriate adjustments gradually; and
c) the fact that in Member States agriculture constitutes a
sector which is closely linked with the economy as a whole.
The common agricultural policy (CAP) is to be established during
the transitional period. Formulating a CAP has been the greatest prob
lem which the member countries of the Community have until now faced.
In June 1960, the Commission submitted a plan to the Council for con
sideration known as the "Mansholt Plan." It was decided that the
Council should come to an agreement concerning this plan by the end of
1961, However, it took until the morning of January 14, 1962 for a
weary and exhausted group of Council members to reach agreement on a
common agricultural policy. This agreement truly cemented together
permanently, the members of the six EEC nations and is probably the
most significant step that has so far been taken by the Six toward an
international form of government.
The primary reason for the great difficulty experienced by the
members in coming to agreement on a CAP and the resulting ridgidity of
controls on international agricultural trade can be explained by the
great degree of power weildedby the farmers in the six countries. The
numbers of farmers are great in each country, and their conviction that
their government had not acted in the farmers* best interests would
hbid.. p. 11.
almost certainly cause the party in power to lose a great deal of sup
port in the next national elections.
It would be wise at this point to make an examination of the
CAP as it was established on January 14, 1962, before going on to a
consideration of the CAP established for cattle and beef cattle prod
ucts.
The CAP will be liberal in its duties on commodities it does
not produce at all or only in small quantities. This includes about
70 percent of United States exports to the Common Market, However,
the other 30 percent of United States exports to the Community will be
restricted in the future by what can possibly be very formidable bar
riers. It should be mentioned that many of the old protective measures
such as tariffs, import quotas, direct cash payments, import subsidies,
minimum price regulations, price supports and others were abolished as
of July 30, 1962 with the inauguration of the new CAP, and others were
to be done away with over a period of time. However, these rcstirctions
have been replaced with others which may or may not be more protective,
depending on the broad political policies followed by the six member
nations.
Grain is the basis of the common agricultural policy. The CAP
in 1962 called for the unification of grain support prices in the Com
munity, elimination of barriers to intra-community trade of those com
modities, and erection of minimum import prices enforced by variable
levies and other measures on imports of grains from third countries.
In speaking of this new variable levy system, Mr. Coppock had this to
It constitutes a rigid, autarkic plan for the control of
agriculture within the EEC. Unmodified, it may provide an enor
mous obstacle to further economic integration in the North
Atlantic region,^
Mr. Sicco Mansholt of the Commission, however, refers to the levy as
"neutral," The levy, he says, in itself is neither good nor bad, but
can be used to free international trade, just as it could possibly be
2
used to create an autarkic Common Market.
Now it will be essential to judge, in this chapter, what indeed
will be the effects of the variable levy system. The CAP decrees that
imports of grains from third countries are to be handled in the follow
ing manner. First of all, there are to be established target prices
on grains. These target prices are the "hub" of the EEC price structure.
The common price level, that Is, the final target prices for the various
grains has not yet been agreed upon. However, each country has its own
upper and lower limits for target prices of its own, and these national
target prices are to be progressively brought together during the tran
sition period. During the transition period, individual countries will
determine their own target prices.
^John 0. Coppock, North Atlantic Policy, the Agricultural Gap,
the Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963, p. 10.
2Sicco Mansholt, Vice President of the Commission of the EEC,
Address to the National Press Club, Washington D. C., April 9, 1963.
Intervention prices, "support price at the wholesale level,"
are to be established at 90 to 95 percent of the designated target
prices. The European Grain Office, which will be under control of the
Commission, must buy all quantities of grain at intervention prices if
they should fall below the intervention price.
Threshold prices are calculated as follows. Trom the final
specified target price is subtracted marketing costs such as transpor
tation and handling costs, from the port of entry to deficit center for
which the target price is established, and to this is added a "lump
sum," or "montant fortaitalre," plus or minus adjustments for quality
standards* The use of the lump sum gives grain imports of member coun
tries preference over third country grain. Increasing the lump sum
would stimulate Community trade.
Now it is possible to consider the "variable import levy" re
garding imports into the Common Market from third countries. The levy
is equal to the EEC threshold price minus the "standardized c.i.f.
price." This levy is the basic feature of the grain program in the
Common Market. The "standardized c.i.f, price is derived by adding to
or subtracting from the lowest world c.i.f. price the "equivalence co
efficients" which reflect the difference in quality between the standard
EEC grains and Imported grains. For each principal variety of cereals,
the lowest determined c.i.f. price is selected.
A system of intra-community levies is presently being used to
equalize differences in price. However, this will be abolished
entirely as the finalized CAP comes into effect.
Very recently, Mr. Mansholt made new proposals for the unifica
tion of EEC grain prices. He has suggested that unification of Common
Market grain prices become effective for the 1964-65 crop instead of
reaching the target prices through stages by 1970. The intervention
price for wheat under this new proposal would be $93.69 a metric ton.
This is an increase of about eight percent over present French prices,
and if as is suggested that the French quantum system be eliminated,
it would mean a 15 percent rise in French wheat prices, and a twenty
percent rise in barley prices. West German prices would be reduced
somewhat. However, this would be a great inducement for French farmers
to increase their grain production,^
The Council has ruled that in order for the Common Market to
achieve Its objectives in agriculture more easily, an European Agricul
tural Fund is to be made up of contributions from the six national
governments and from money received from levies on imports of these com
modities. The Fund will then be used to subsidize exports from the EEC
to third countries, contribute to structural improvement programs in
The Common Market and to buy up these commodities at intervention prices.
Thus if the CAP proved to be restrictive and the variable levies ex
cessive, surpluses would develop in the Common Market and thus subsidized
Common Market feed grains would compete with United States exports on
the world markets.
^Raymond A, Tones, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, Talk at the 41st Annual Agri
cultural Outlook Conference, Washington D, C., November 18, 1963, pp.
4 and 5«
The Proposed Common Agricultural Policy for Cattle
and Beef Cattle Products
As with all other agricultural commodities, It has proven dif
ficult to reach agreement for a CAP on beef« The effective date for
the regulations on beef and beef products has had to be postponed
several times, but the Commission has submitted Its recommendations
and the Council has established the date of December 31, 1963 as the
target approval of the CAP for beef and beef products.^ The CAP for
these commodities Is to become effective In the first quarter of 1964.
Sixty percent alignment of the national tariffs to the common external
tariff (GET) Is to be reached by March 31, 1964, and then full GET will
become effective by April 1, 1966.
The Import restrictions placed on beef and beef products by
commodities will now be considered. Table 10 shows the common external
tariffs which will be placed on the various commodities.
For cattle, and calves there will be a 16 percent ad valorem
tariff and for fresh and chilled beef there will be a 20 percent ad
valorem tariff, about twice the 1961 tariff level. As was the case
with feed grains, both of these commodities will be subjected to target
prices. Intervention prices and gate prices. The gate price Is simply
Martin V. Gerrity, Chief, Commodity Analysis Branch, Foreign
Agricultural Service, "Common Market Regulations and U.S. Livestock
and Meat Product Exports," Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-132,
Washington D.C., August 1963, p. 28,
Table 10. Proposed Conmon External Tariffs of the European
Economic Community on Cattle and Beef Products
Cattle and calves
Beef and veal
Fresh or chilled
Frozen
Variety meats (offal)
Tallow (inedible)
Canned beef
Beef sausage, etc.
Hides and skins
Casings
Common External
Tariff
ercent ad valorem
16
Import
Certificates
and Deposits
Source; Martin V. Gerrity, Chief, Commodity Analysis Branch, Foreign
Agricultural Service, "Common Market Regulations and U.S.
livestock and Meat Product Exports," Livestock and Meat
Situation, LMS-132, Washington D.C., August 1963, p. 29.
A minimum import price, whose objective it is to bring the value of
beef and veal into line with the domestic price of these commodities.
The Cononon Market Commission has proposed fixed target prices for each
Member State on the basis of an arithmetic average of wholesale prices
during the two years prior to the effective date of the regulations.
Annual reviews will bring the target prices of the separate countries
into line by April 1, 1967 at the latest.
As with grains there is to bo an Intervention price for fattle
and beef and veal. If domestic prices fall more than seven percent be
low target prices. Member States can intervene in the domestic market,
and make purchases to keep the price up. The criteria for establishing
intervention prices has not yet been determined. Neither has the
threshold price for imports been determined by the Council.
Gate prices will approximate the target prices minus the fixed
GET. If selling prices at the frontier are lower than the gate price,
the difference will be made up by a variable Import levy. Thus, in
other words, the world price plus the levy equals the gate price, and
the gate price plus the common external tariff equals the target price
within the Community.
A different method has been chosen to deal with frozen beef.
It has the same common external tariff of 20 percent as have fresh and
chilled beef and veal, but it also has a quota of 22,000 metric tons.
Inter EEC tariff duties on trade in frozen beef are to be eliminated
by April 1, 1967.
There will be no Import gate prices or target prices for the
following commodities to be discussed: variety meats, canned beef,
tallow, and hides and skins. Variety meats have a 20 percent customs
duty which is considerably higher than the previous national rates of
5 to 12 percent. Though variety meats have no target prices, they are
subject to the issuance of "import certificates and deposits."
There are practically no barriers to imports of tallow. Tallow
has a twopexceti^had valorem GET but will not be subject to a gate
price ct import certificates and deposits. Canned beef is subject to
import certificates and deposits, as well as a high 26 percent ad
valorem GET, Beef sausage is also subject to import certificates and
deposits and to the high GET of 21 percent.
There are no obstacles to the study of hides and skins or beef
casings. There will be no GET, gate price nor system of import cer
tificates and deposits. Variety meats of cattle and Inedible tallow
are isolated from further trade restrictions because of GAIT agreements
In 1962. To tighten controls of these commodities would require com
pensatory concessions to third countries hurt by this action.
Reaction to the Gommon Agricultural Policy
A GAIT committee was established to examine the common agricul
tural policy, to determine the trade effects of this policy. It
reported as follows:
While noting the view that the levy system was designed
so as to maintain at least the same level of production which
prevailed previously in the Member States, some members of the
Committee were of the opinion that the regime contained certain
elements which might well make it even more restrictive. These
characteristics deserved, in their view, particular weight since
potential new members of the Community, which operated hitherto
under far less restrictive import systems, might well take part
in the new regime.
Exporting countries of the Committee felt that the
system constituted a complete insulation of the producers in the
Community from effects of price competition from more effective
external suppliers. External suppliers would obtain no benefit
in the market of the Community from further increases in effi
ciency, As the members of the Committee saw it, the CAP for
cereals gave domestic suppliers over protection against external
suppliers during the transitional period by the amount of the
•montant forfaitaire,* It provided support arrangements extend
ing to every form of cereals the producer cared to grow. It
provided the assurance that an intervention agency was obligated
to pay a predetermined price for every ton produced which was
not sold at a better price on the commercial market. It gave
internal producers freedom from price competition from external
suppliers. It gave producers a reserve safeguard that if all
else failed to protect them, if for example purchases by the
intervention authority should reach levels so as to become
embarrasing, then quantitative restrictions could be applied to
imports ... Thus, these members suggested that as a system
of protection, disregarding for the moment the level of prices,
it was as watertight a system as could be developed.^
The Committee concluded its report with this paragraph:
Exporting members of the Committee felt that a closed
market system in which a high level of price supports exists,
could not fail to generate increased levels of production which
in turn were protected by the levy system allied to safeguard
measures including a possible embargo on imports. Combined with
the element of Community preference to promote a higher level of
intra-Community trade, such a situation could only result in
displacement of imports from third countries who could further
be paralyzed by fiercer competition in price in non-EEC markets
to the extent that the EEC exported its surpluses with the aid of
: the refund system. Efficient producers in third countries
could not possibly protect themselves against these effects by
lowering their own costs. This adverse impact on world trade
assumed even greater importance if and as the Six became an
enlarged Community. The very size of such a Community as an
economic unit, could enable it to dictate the terms of trade in
agricultural products to the outside world. The effects nn third
country producers could be alleviated by the adoption of a low
price policy.
Alternative Policies for the Common Market
There are four distinct paths that the Common Market could fol
low in the future. It could remain its present size and allow no more
1a, H, Turner, Director, Economics Division, Canada Department
of Agriculture, Speech to Symposium on Food, People and Trade, Seattle,
January 18, 1963,
'ibid.
full members into the Community, or it could, on the other hand, en
large into a Community embracing all of Western Europe. Already four
countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway have applied
for full membership, and many other nations for association status.
Also, the Community could take a so called "outward-looking*' policy
toward third countries, that is a liberal non-restrictive approach to
trade, or it could be "inward-looking," and seek to become a self-
sufficient third world super-pcwer. Independent of the United States
and all other non-member nations. All these possibilities must be
examined, for it is difficult now, while the EEC is still in its
formative stages, to predict what road it will choose to follow. Any
of these alternatives is a very distinct possibility, and cannot be
neglected by a researcher who is about to make projections on future
conditions within the Community, and their effects on trade. The al
ternatives will now be briefly examined.
The first alternative to be considered is that the Community
will retain its present number and that this Six will be liberal in
its outlook to trade, that it will seek to trade according to the laws
of comparative advantage^ as much as is politically feasible. In the
Common Market as presently constituted, there are several reasons for
being optimistic about a relatively free trade policy. In the first
place, it just makes good economic sense for the nations of Europe to
^For a definition of "comparative advantage" see the Glossary
of Terms, Appendix A.
specialize in the production of coomodities in which they are most
efficient, to export the surpluses and to import those commodities in
which they are relatively Inefficient. Europe is comparatively in
efficient in the production of most agricultural products. The
principle of comparative advantage in this case would dictate that
the Community, in order to prosper, should import many agricultural
commodities and export industrial goods in which production is rela
tively efficient.
Another reason supporting increased trade is that higher prices
resulting from protectionist agriculture would encourage farmers to
stay on the farms. This would retard progress in agricultural produc
tivity and would make foods unnecessarily expensive.
Finally, it can be argued that a rise in the prices of agricul
tural products would raise food prices and since expenditures for food
take up such a great portion of the average consumer's income, this
price rise would be inflationary. Inflationary pressures would raise
the wage scale and as a result industrial goods would become more ex
pensive and therefore not as competitive on the world markets. It is
to be expected that for these reasons, the majority of industrialists
in the Community will work to bring about the outward-looking Community.
The United States would support such a policy. President Ken
nedy, in his July 4, 1962 address, said that the United States would
be willing in the future to sign a "declaration of interdependence"
with such an Europe. Such a policy would enable the United States to
retain and perhapa even expand Its already huge export surplus to the
Community, This would alleviate its much publicized balance o£ pay
ment difficulties.
John 0, Coppock said, in his book, **North Atlantic Policy, The
Agricultural Gap,*'
If it is right to reshape the economic structure of the
North Atlantic region to make it more mutually interdependent
in the supply of many primary materials and manufactures, It Is
surely proper to extend that Independence to the production
of food. In fact unification of the market makes more sense
for agrloQltare than for many other sectors of the economy, for
there are greater potentialities in agriculture for economical
geographical specialization.
But, as Mr, Coppock says, though the ex-farmer in a factory Is
worth much more than a farmer in the field, *'right now, the farmers,
in all their numbers, are in the field - a fact that receives wide
spread political recognition,*'^
A second route the Six can follow is that of a protectionist
Community. It can use the variable import levy to raise insurmountable
barriers around the Community'*s external borders. It can attempt to
achieve self-sufficiency in agriculture. Surely, this would be econom
ically unsound, but by so doing, it would need to rely on no nation
for assistance, and could feel secure in its sovereignty and independ
ence, It would not be bound by economic and the usually resulting
military and political ties, and could be "master of its own house.**
^John 0, Coppock, o£, cit., p. 178.
^Ibld,, p, 21,
The United States has worked hard to eradicate this type of
attitude, but there are powerful forces within the Community which
believe that such a policy would be the most beeeflcial to them.
Leaders such as General de Gaulle of France arc the external manifesta
tion of this type of thinking. De Gaulle has effectively shut the
door to British entry, at least for the time bein^ and public opinion
in his own country does not seem to be greatly adverse to him for
doing so, De Gaulle envisages the renaissance of a united Europe as
being possibly only under the strong leadership of one of the countries
of the Community, namely France. It cannot be to him a purely co
operative effort. It has been De Gaulle's ambition to unite West
Germany especially closely with France so that the two nations under
French leadership may determine Common Market policies. One method
of so doing was the Franco-German Treaty, Commenting on the Franco-
German Treaty, Sicco Mansholt of the BEG Commission said:
The treaty requires the governments of both nations to
consult each other in all matters concerning Common Market
affairs and to strive for prior agreement. Looking ahead to
January 1, 1966, these two major nations will have the voting
strength to bloc every Community decision in the Common Market's
Council of Ministers. Their prior consultations will deny the
essential quality of our Community ... which is the mutual
confidence and equality of all members.*
Britain is the world's greatest importer of foodstuffs.
Approximately half the foods consumed by its 53,000,000 population is
imported. If the United Kingdom should be accepted as a full member
^Sicco Mansholt, o£, cit.
of the CoQSDon Market, along with the other applicants for nembership,
then the policy taken by the Conmunity in the field of agricultural
imports will be much more important to the United States and other
exporting nations of agricultural products in the world. It is
estimated that the United Kingdom and West Germany import approximately
two-thirds of all foodstuffs traded within Western Europe, and about
60 percent of all foodstuffs imported from outside of Europe.
It is very likely that with the United Kingdom in the Community,
policies toward agricultural trade would be liberal. The United King
dom could not in good faith discard its traditional agricultural sup
pliers in order to promote self-sufficiency within the Community.
Furthermore, British subjects would not tolerate the great increases
in the prices of foods which would result. Besides, the Common Market
exporting countries could not at their present rate of production or
even at greatly increased rates hope to supply the United Kingdom with
its gargantuan demand for imports of foods. Therefore, in considering
the enlarged Community, it is necessary to give special attention to
a fairly liberal trading bloc, without unduly high common external
barriers to agricultural trade.
Also, Denmark, Norway and Ireland, the other countries that have
applied for full membership, have Important livestock industries that
depend on low-cost imports of feed grains. They would therefore
naturally fight any tendancy toward autarky in the common agricultural
policy.
However, more than token consideration must be made of the
fourth and final alternative, that of a Western European Economic
Community, with a protectionist CAP. Precisely because of the argu->
ments stated above. It is unlikely that an EEC with the United Kingdom
would move in the direction of autarky. Rather, it is to be expected
that such a Community would seek greater specialization in all phases
of production, and as a result, increase emphasis on imports of
agricultural commodities. However, this alternative should not be
overlooked* It may be that the government of Britain will deem entry
into the Community of such paramount Importance that it will accept
a protectionist agriculture. Although unlikely, the opportunities
for industrial exports within the Community may be deemed to outweigh
the losses which would result from higher food prices. In this case,
the Community would have a huge and adverse effect on world trade In
agricultural commodities. Surpluses would build up in exporting
countries, and world prices of agricultural commodities would fall.
However, actual projections and estimations of such effects will be
left for consideration in Chapter VII.
CHAPTER VII
PRESENT EEC IMPORTS OF CATTLE AND BEEF CATTLE PRODUCTS,
IRQIECTIONS TO 1970, AND EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE
ccmon MARKET POLICIES ON THE UNITED STATES
Because of the sheer quantity of inforisation assembled in this
chapter, a brief sunmary is included at this point for purposes of
orientation,
1, The first part of this chapter will deal with 1962 calendar
year imports of cattle and beef cattle products by the EEC. This will
Indicate not only the Importance of the Common Market as a market for
world exports of these commodities, but also the chief suppliers of
the EEC in cattle and beef cattle products. Cattle and beef cattle
products will be discussed in the following order: a) EEC imports of
cattle and calves; b) EEC imports of beef and veal; c) EEC imports of
variety meats; d) EEC imports of tallow and greases; e) EEC iiiq>orts of
bovine hides and skins; and f) EEC imports of other beef cattle prod
ucts*
2. Following this analysis a study will be made of present im
ports of feed grains by the European Economic Ccxnmunlty* This study
will be made primarily to determine the degree to \diich the EEC pres
ently relies on the United States for its feed grain supplies, the
possibilities of future EEC self-sufficiency in feed grains, and
finally, so that later estimates can be made of the effects on the
United States of changes in the level of EEC imports from the United
States.
3. Projections will then be made to 1970 for EEC feed grain
import requirements under various conditions. Projections will be made
on the assumption that there will be no change in the agricultural
policies of the member nations. Then projected import requirements
under alternative policies can be compared with the first projection,
and conclusions may be reached concerning the kind and degree of effects
from each of the various policies.
4. Projections will be made to 1970 for EEC beef and veal Im
port requirements. It will be essential to this study to know what
amounts of beef and veal will be imported by the EEC in 1970 if EEC
policies continue into the future as they are now, and who will be the
principal suppliers. This will allow a comparison for import require
ments under the alternative agricultural policies that may be followed
by the EEC.
5. Finally, effects of the various policies on EEC imports can
be estimated in quantitative terms. Redirection of trade can be
estimated, and the resulting effects of each of the possible future
EEC agricultural policies on the United States beef cattle Industry
can be evaluated.
Present Imports of Cattle and Beef Cattle Products
by the European Economic Community
EEC Imports of Live Cattle and Calves
In Tables 1 and 2, Chapter II, It was shown that the EEC Imported
876,100 head of cattle and calves in the 1961 calendar year, and exported
only 273,100 head of cattle and calves* The net import balance than, of
cattle numbers for the Common Market, was 603,000* The other great
European Importer was the United Kingdom, It had a net Import balance
of 502,900 head of cattle and calves In 1961*
However, if total Western Europe trade in cattle and calves is
considered, it will be seen that exports of 1,804,000 almost equaled
the Imports of 1,829,000 head of cattle and calves. This would lead
to the conclusion that trade In this commodity In Western Europe Is
almost entirely among Western European countries. Countries outside
of Europe are not important as suppliers of live cattle to the Common
Market, the United Kingdom, or other Western European countries.
Within the Community Itself, France and the Netherlands are net
exporters of cattle and calves. The Belglum~Luxembourg Economic Union
(BLEU) Is almost entirely self-sufficient in cattle and calf numbers*
Germany and Italy account for all the EEC Imports of live cattle and
calves*
A more recent and complete summary of Common Market Imports of
live cattle and calves la given in Table 11. Imports of beef cattle
and calves from all sources Into the Common Market amounted to
Table ll. Common Market Imports oB Beet Cattle and Calves,
and Sources of These Imports, Calendar Year 1962
World
EEC
France
Netherlands
Assoc. couns. &
terra.
Third countries
BFTA
USA
Commonwealth
couns.
United Kingdom
Ireland
Denmark
Austria
France BLEU Keths Germ, Italy
m.t.^ $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000 $1000
350 1W,927' 5,009 iTOS? 8,767 75,173 53,789
36.0 19,373 3,863 3U0 812 3,332 11,026
17.5 7,814 22 1 1,829 5,962
12.8 9,480 3,647 - —
13 13
309.1 124,441 1,133
222.7 86,844 989
89
11.2
7.9
152.8
52.2
81
3,732
3,754
57,051
23,209
749 7,955 71,841 42,763
656 7,262 57,760 20,177
4 85
120 3,006 3 9
91 366 3,301
536 4,256 48,048 73,876
9,176 14,033
1000 metric tons
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community, Foreign Trade
Statistics Analytical Tables - Imports, January"December 1962,
Brussels, August 1963, p. 17.
$143,827,000 in the 1962 calendar year. Trade among Community countries
totaled only $19,373,000, while $124,441,000 came from third countries,
of which $86,844,000 or 69.8 percent came from EpTA countries. Denmark
and Austria were the two greatest ^TA exporters, and together sent
$80,260,000 or 92.9 percent of ETTA exports of cattle and calves to
the EEC. Associated territories and countries of the EEC are very in
significant as suppliers of live cattle and calves to the Common Market.
West Germany and Italy together imported $128,962,000 in cattle and
calves. This was 89.7 percent of EEC imports.
As previously stated, Ireland is an important exporter of live
cattle and calves, but exports from Ireland go almost entirely to the
United Kingdom as "feeders*" Irish exports of cattle and calves to
the Common Market are small. Table 11 shows that only $3,754,000 worth
of cattle and calves went to the Common Market from Ireland in 1962.
Because trade in cattle and calves in Western Europe is almost
entirely between the Western European nations, it is unlikely that any
common agricultural policy of the EEC on this item will directly affect
the United States cattlemen. The major exporters of cattle and beef
products, such as Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, do not ship
large numbers of cattle to the Common Market or to any Western European
country, and they would be little affected by restrictive policies of
the Common Market live cattle imports.
There is the possibility, however, that a protectionist six-
member EEC, restricting cattle imports from third countries such as
Denmark and Austria, would increase slaughter in these countries, and
would thereby increase world exports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef
and veal. This would cause some increase in competition in Europe
among major exporting nations, and might cause a redirection of some
beef and veal to the United States. However, the tentative ^^ad valorem
tariff on live cattle and calves is 16 percent, without any other re
strictions, and it is unlikely that this tariff will have any serious
effect on the present volume of trade between the Community and other
European nations. There is no variable levy on cattle imports, ao the
effects of any Common Market policy on future EEC imports of live beef
cattle will not likely affect the United States cattlemen.
EEC Imports of Beef and Veal
Demand for beef and veal has increased rapidly since the EEC
came into being in 1958, Indeed, demand for beef has risen sharply
throughout Europe in the 1950*8 because of Increasing European incomes.
Prices have risen, and as a result, production has been stimulated
considerably, particularly in France and the Netherlands, both of whom
are now net exporters of beef and veal.
Beef presently comes almost entirely from dual-purpose cattle.
In other words, the cattle which are slaughtered for beef have been
used for dairy purposes as well. One thing that increased cattle
production in the EEC would tend to do, therefore, would be to increase
the supply of dairy products. However, this would be undesirable to
European and Common Market nations because a surplus ef dairy products
is already developing. Hence, if domestic production is to increase,
European farmers will have to change from the traditional production
of beef from dual-purpose cattle, and begin production of beef cattle.
Such a change is possible, and highly desirable, since there is a good
deal of grass and pasture land within the Common Market suited to this
purpose. These cattle are not important grain consumers but will un
doubtedly become so in the future.
Production of beef and veal in the past in the Community has
increased steadily from the 1955-56 figure of 2,836,000 metric tons to
Table 12, Common Market Imports of Beef and Veal, and
Sources of Imports, Calendar Year 1962.
World
EEC
France
Netherlands
Assoc. couns. &
terrs.
Third countries
ETTA
USA
Commonwealth
couns•
New Zealand
Argentina
Denmark
1000
m.t.*
247.8
97.7
61.9
29,2
$1000
148j506
68,295
33,823
29,721
• 7 695
149;0 79,303
31.2 23,540
2/ 16
367
336
38,371
22,385
France BLEU
w.
Neths Germ.
$1000 $1000 $1000 $1000
10,967 9732T S7556 61,278
9,889 2,108 3,723 38,605
7 3,117 29,02^f
8,7U6 2,044 9,322
695 -
382 7,213 4,832 22,673
89 20 38 8,240
15
1 2
1 i 2
7 5,249 4,729
89 12
254
228
9,767
7,572
$1000
58,384
13,970
1,674
9,609
44,203
15,153
1
110
105
19,219
14,712
JlOOO metric tons
^Less than 50 metric tons
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community, Foreign Trade
Statistics, Analytical Tables - Imports, January-December
1962, Brussels. August 1963, pp.18 and 19,
3,423,000 metric tons in the 1960-61 fiscal year. Net imports of beef
and veal, however, have remained fairly regular since the inception
of the EEC, and in the 1957-58 to 1960-61 period, have averaged 242,000
metric tons,^
According to Table 12, the Common Market imported 247,800 metric
tons of beef and veal valued in 1962 at $148,506,000. Within the
^Statistical Office of the European Communities, Statistique
Agricole, Brussels, 1963, pp. 42-52.
Connon Market, it appears that West Germany and Italy are the two most
Important importers of beef and veal. These two countries in the 1962
calendar year imported $119,662,000 worth of beef and veal. This was
80.6 percent of all Common Market Imports of this commodity, France
and the Netherlands, both net exporters of beef and veal, provided
$63,544,000, or 93,0 percent of the EEC's total exports of $68,295,000
to the Common Market countries,
Argentina and Denmark dominated exports to the EEC from third
countries, Argentina shipped $38,371,000 in beef and veal to the EEC
in 1962, while Denmark exported $22,385,000 to the EEC, Their combined
shipments of $60,756,000 accounted for 76,6 percent of total exports
of $79,303,000 to the EEC from third countries, Danish exports con
stitute almost all exports from the EFTA, As was the case with imports
of live cattle, imports from associated countries and territories, the
Commonwealth and the United States were relatively small.
Total exclusion, at this time, of third countries from the Com
mon Market, would therefore mean a loss in beef and veal exports of
approximately $79,000,000 annually. However, such a drastic change
is very unlikely, since domestic producers would be initially at least
unable to fill the gap in demand between production and consumption.
Consumer reaction to the resulting higher prices would be immediate
and sharp. Yet it is not impossible that a good portion of these ex
ports could be curtailed by the EEC countries within a period of time.
It will, therefore, be considered later in this chapter, what would
Table 13. Net Imports of Beef and Veal by Applicants for Full
Membership to the European Economic Community, 1962,
United Kingdom Denmark^ Ireland^
1000
m.t.^
Australia 35.5
New Zealand 7.6
Other
Commonwealth 14.0
Irish
Republic 22,0
Netherlands 3.7
Uruguay 17.4
Argentine
Republic 183.9
Others 48.2
Total 332.3
$1000 $1000
«orj
way
1000
m.t.5
The "Ten"
Tm
$1000$1000
19,396
3,684
9,231
14,948
5,395
8,387
87,761
25,624
176,422 -i9*208 -43,514 .-400
Net exports In dollar terms for beef only,
given.
^961 figures used.
Excludes net Imports of Norway.
1961 net Import figures for Ireland used.
^1000 metric tons
Value of veal exports not
Sources: 1) A.F. Knudsen, Agricultural Counselor, Danish Embassy,
letter to Author Containing Danish Trade Figures for
Cattle^ Beef Products and Feed Grains, 1962, Washington
D.C., October 1963.
2) OliverLawrence, Assistant to Agricultural and Food Attache,
British Embassy, Letter to Author Containing British Trade
Figures for Cattle, Beef Products and Feed Grains, 1962,
Washington D.C., October 1963.
3) Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation,
Trade Yearbook. Rome, 1962, pp. 52-55.
4) S.J. McConogh, Agricultural Counsellor, Embassy of Ire
land, Letter to Author Containing Irish Trade Figures
for Cattle, Beef Products and Feed Grains, 1962, Washing
ton D.C., October 1963.
b« the effecta of a protectionist policy on beef and veal exports to
the EEC from third countries by the year 1970.
Now imports of beef and veal and their sources by the four
countries which have applied for full membership to the Community must
be examined. If these countries become full members by the year 1970,
the Common Market agricultural policy will represent all ten members.
The net import data for beef and veal are given in Table 13,
The United Kingdom is the only net Importer among these four
countries. In 1962, it iiiq>orted 332,339 metric tons of beef and veal
from foreign countries. The value of these exports amounted to
$176,422,000. Thus, the United Kingdom Imported more In quantity and
value of beef and veal than the entire European Economic Community,
Other prospective full members, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, are all
net exporters of beef and veal. Unfortunately, 1962 figures were not
available for Norway. However Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter II show that
Norway was a net exporter of beef and veal in 1961 with a small favor
able balance of trade In beef and veal amounting to 400 metric tons.
Exports of beef and veal from Ireland, Denmark and Norway equaled
approximately 152,100 metric tons in 1962, and net imports for the
four applicants for full membership amounted to approximately 180,200
metric tons. The value of net imports shown In Table 14 is underesti
mated to the extent that exports of veal in dollar terms from Ireland
and Denmark are not included. The value of total imports of the ten
nations in beef and veal approximated $252,206,000.
Argentina was the most important exporter of beef and veal to
the Ten as well as to the Six in 1962, accounting for 270,943 metric
tons or $126,132,000 In exports. This was over one-half of the value
of total exports of beef and veal to the ten nations. Denmark was
second In Importance. Almost all Danish exports of beef and veal to
the other nine members go to West Germany and Italy. The United
Kingdom Is not an Important market for Danish beef and veal. In
1962, Denmark exported 29,300 tons of beef and veal to the EEC valued
at over $23,000,000. Australia exported 35,500 tons valued at almost
$20,000,000. Uruguay, which exported 17,400 tons worth over $7,000,000
to the ten countries, and Kew Zealand, are also important suppliers.
While EEC Imports from third countries equaled 149,000 tons,
Imports of the six nations from sources outside the Ten amounted to
only 117,000 tons. Net Imports of the four applicants for full member
ship totaled 176,500 tons from sources outside the ten countries.
Therefore, net imports of beef and veal by the Ten from third countries
amounted In 1962 to approximately 293,500 metric tons.
Other countries which must be taken Into consideration are those
which have applied for associate membership. FAQ trade figures for
1961 show Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria to be net
Importers of beef and veal. In 1961, these five countries had net
Imports amounting to 41,900 metric tons.^
^rade Yearbook 1962, op. clt., pp. 52-55.
Since the proposed ad valorem tariff on imports of beef and
veal at 20 percent is almost twice that of the former average tariff
of the four tariff zones, and since there is to be a potentially
restrictive target price and a variable import levy established by
the Coimnunity by the year 1970, it is conceivable that the EEC could,
by that time, keep out, or at least nearly so, the 1^9,000 metric
tons of beef and veal presently imported from third countries. If
the four applicants to the EEC become members by 1970, the 293,500
metric tons imported from countries outside the Ten in 1962 could be
affected seriously be protectionist EEC policies* However, import
requirements will not be the same in 1970 and therefore estimates of
the effects of alternative policies on imports from third countries
will be made after projections for imports have been established*
The Six are presently only 91,5 percent self-sufficient in
beef and veal production. With the addition of the United Kingdom to
EEC membership, self-sufficiency in beef and veal would drop to 86,1
percent. However, if Denmark is added, self-sufficiency rises to
89,9 percent and with the addition of Norway and Ireland as well, the
ten members would be 93,6 percent self-sufficient in the production
of beef and veal.^
European Economic Community, Official ^okesman of the Commis
sion, "The Common Market Policy - Protectionist or Liberal?", Infor
mation VtsmOrn Statlatical Annexes, Brussels, February 1962, p.2.
EEC Imports of Variety Meats
Both the Common Market and the United Kingdom are large import
ers of variety meats (edible offals). With Increased cattle slaughter
in Europe, because of growing demand for beef, European production of
variety meats will increase, whatever the EEC common agricultural
policy. There is to be, according to the tentative Commission proposals
for beef and veal and beef products, a 20 percent ad valorem tariff on
variety meats throughout the Community by 1970, Also there are to be
import certificates and deposits for imports of variety meats. It is
obvious, then, that if the basic agricultural policy of the Community
is to be protectionist, imports of variety meats can be largely ellm-
imated. Similarly, if the EEC policy is liberal, the differences
between EEC consumer demand and ' EEC production of variety meats will
be much the same as would have been the case under a continuation of
national policies, and will be readily filled by third country export-
Table Ih summarizes quantities and values of imports of variety
meats and their sources for the EEC, the United Kingdom and the Ten.
It shows that in 1962, the six EEC member nations imported 70,700 metric
tons of variety meats from third countries valued at $36,648. Western
Germany with imports of 44,542 metric tons valued at $19,265,000 and
France with imports of 25,961 metric tons valued at $11,615,000 were
the major EEC importers of variety meats. The Netherlands was the
Table .Imports of Variety Meats by the "Six", the
United Kingdom, and the "Ten," Calendar Year 1962
EEC
$1000 1000 m.t
World 36,648 82.4
EEC 5,634 11.6
Netherlands 4,653 8.3
Assoc. couns.
& terrs. 26 1/
Third countries 30,982 70.7
EFTA 9,224 21.2
USA 16,395 34.7
Commonwealth 891 1,8
Denmark 8,704 20.4
Argentina 2,974 8,3
Australia 253 ,4
New Zealand 256 ,4
United
Kingdom
1000 m.t.
84.3
Denmark,
Ireland I
Norway
1000 m.t
13
The "Ten"
1000 m.t.'
153.7
Less than 50 metric tons
^1960 figures
^FAO figures, 1961
'^ lOOO metric tona
Sources: 1) Statistical Office of the European Community, Foreign
Trade Statistics, Analytical Tables - Imports, January-
December, 1962, Brussels, August 1963, p.20.
2) United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul
tural Service, The United Kingdom Livestock and Meat
Industry, tAS*132, U,S,D,A,, March 1962, p, 14,
principal exporting EEC nation. In 1962, its exports of $4,653,000
constituted the greatest share of total EEC exports.^
The most important third country supplier in 1962 was the United
States, It shipped 34,700 of the total 82,400 metric tons imported
^Foreign Trade Statistics Analytical Table - Imports 1962
January-December, op. cit,, p, 20,
by the EEC, United Stetes exports to the EEC, worth $16,395,000
equaled,, in quantitative terms, ^2,1 percent of total EEC imports of
variety meats. Other important suppliers to the EEC were Denmark and
Argentina, Denmark exported 20,400 metric tons to the Common Market
in 1962, or 24,8 percent of total EEC imports. These were valued at
$8,704,000, Argentina exported 8,300 metric tons of variety meats to
the Community. These exports, worth $2,974,000 accounted for 10,1
percent of total EEC imports, measured in quantitative terms.
If the four applicants for membership were to join the EEC, the
net importation of variety meats by the Community would have been much
greater. This would be wholly because of imports by the United
Kingdom. The three other countries, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, are
all net exporters of variety meats. It was shown in Chapter II that
net exports of *'offals, game and other meat" by these countries amounted
to 38,700 metric tons. However, no more than approximately one-third
of the items in this category would come from cattle sources, so a
rough estimate of net exports of variety meats from beef sources would
be 13,000 metric tons. The United Kingdom, however, imported 84,300
metric tons of variety meats in 1962. This figure is slightly larger
than the total EEC Import figure for variety meats, A ten member EEC
would have imported a net amount of approximately 153,700 metric tons
of variety meats in 1962,
Suppliers to the United Kingdom include Argentina, Australia,
New Zealand and the United States. In 1960, Argentina exported 13,200
metric tons of variety meats to the United Kingdom. This was 15.7
percent of total EEC Imports. Australian exports In 1962 to the United
Kingdom of 11,900 metric tons accounted for 1^.1 percent of the United
Kingdom's Imports. New Zealand's exports of 15,600 metric tons was
18.5 percent of exports to the United Kingdom, and exports of 14,600
metric tons by the United States equaled 17.3 percent of imports of
variety meats by the United Kingdom.
Among important third country exporters to the "Ten" are Argen
tina, with approximately 21,500 metric tons exported annually,
Australia with 12,300 metric tons, New Zealand with 16,000 metric tons,
and the United States with 49,300 metric tons annually.
Because of Increased cattle slaughter In the EEC and a trend
for higher quality meats as a result of Increasing Incomes, It Is not
expected that Import demand for variety meats will Increase signifi
cantly by the year 1970. Therefore, If variety meats were to be ex
cluded from the EEC, the United States would stand to lose approximately
$16,000,000 In exports of variety meats. However, In Chapter IV It
was estimated that of this, only half, or $8,553,000 come from cattle
sources. About half this amount Is shipped yearly to the United Kingdom,
so apprcoclmately $12,000,000 worth of variety meats from beef sources
exported from the United States to the Ten yearly could be lost by
restrlctlonlst policies of the enlarged Community. Exports of variety
meats to European countries outside the Ten are practically negligible.
ao that if the Consnon Market Included all applicants for aasociation
as well, the figure cited above would still be approximately correct.
ETC Imports of Tallow and Greases
Inedible tallow is the most important single beef cattle commodity
which the United States exports. In the 1962 calendar year, 1,370,018
pounds of inedible tallow from beef sources, valued at $88,151,000
were exported from the United States. Of this, $26,375,000 went to
the EEC and $1,112,000 went to the United Kingdom.^ Within the
Community, France is already a large exporter. Among prospective
full member, the United Kingdom is a net exporter of tallow and
greases.
The only proposed restriction to tallow imports by the Common
Market is a two percent ad valorem tariff. There will be no variable
levy and no import certificates or deposits required. Tallow and
greases will therefore be virtually devoid of any trade restrictions.
It is not to be expected that a two percent ad valorem tariff will
seriously restrict imports. Futhermore, it has been agreed by the
EEC in GATT negotiations that any further restrictions to tallow
imports will be met by increased restrictions, by nations exporting
tallow, on imports from the Common Market.
Therefore, in all probability, if tallow exports of the United
States to the Common Market in the future are decreased, the reason
See Table 5, Chapter IV,
will almost certainly be increased Community supply of tallow, and
increased use of substitutes which would have come about regardless
of the common agricultural policy of the EEC, and not because of any
new CAP restrictions.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the most important United
States export item from cattle sources, tallow and greases, will in
all likelihood not be adversely affected by the future Common Market
policies. Trade in this very important United States export item,
therefore, need not be given intensive attention in the remainder of
this thesis.
The only way that the CAP can affect imports of tallow is by
its emphasis on beef production in the Community itself. If it should
promote greatly increased numbers of beef cattle, then the by-products,
including tallow will be increased, and there will be a smaller demand
for imports of these by-products, as a result. Indeed, as will be
seen, a liberal trade policy will in all probability mean greater
domestic cattle production than would a protective policy by the Common
Market countries, and this will mean greater EEC tallow production.
EEC Imports of Cattle and Calf Hides and Skins
Production of hides and skins from bovine animals will increase
with growth in Community production of cattle and calves. There will
be absolutely no obstacles to future imports of hides and skins by the
Common Market. There is to be no common external tariff for hides and
flkina, no gate price and no important certificates or deposits required*
Thus the second most important United States export item from beef
cattle sources will be exempt from trade barriers by the new proposed
common agricultural policy* Prospects are therefore favorable for
the United States to continue at its present level of exports in this
commodity, no matter which type of CAP the Community may choose to
follow. Thus it appears that the two commodities which account for
81 percent of United States exports of cattle and beef cattle products,
tallow and hides and skins, will be relatively unaffected by the
forthcoming common agricultural policy of the EEC. Membership of the
four applicants will likely not hurt United States exports either.
The United Kingdom imports very few hides and skins, and Denmark,
Ireland, and Norway, idio are all net exporters of beef and veal are
net exporters of cattle and calf hides and skins as well.
Competition now for the EEC market is between Argentina, who
exported $18,576,000 of total EEC imports of $137,956,000, the United
States, with exports of $15,089,000, Commonwealth countries, who ex-
ported $16,940,000 in hides and skins to the EEC in 1962, and Australia
and New Zealand, whose combined exports totaled $7,147,000, EEC
countries themselves supplied $53,291,000 of the total $137,956,000
imported by all EEC countries.^
Foreign Trade Statistics* Analytical Tables - Imports, January-
December, 1962, op. cit., p. 22. ——
The United Kingdom has imported a steadily decreasing amount
of hides and skins in recent years. Countries outside of Europe which
compete for the United Kingdom's market include Argentina, Australia
and New Zealand.
Thus, it may be concluded, that just as was the case with
Community imports of tallow and greases, so is it true that imports
of cattle hides and calf skins will likely decrease as cattle produc
tion within the Community and Europe increases. However, the United
States has a good chance of being able to hold its own with other
nations competing for the EEC market. It may well be that a liberal
European policy, which would permit large imports of feed grains at
low prices would have the most harmful effects on tallow and hides and
skins exports to the EEC, for such a free«trade policy would make it
economical for European Community farmers to feed cattle and increase
cattle production, and thereby production of cattle by-products such
as hides and skins and tallow.
BBC Imports of Other Beef Cattle Products
There will be no restrictions to the entry of beef casings into
the Common Market from exporting nations. There will be no tariff,
levy, nor import certificates or deposits. Future Common Market policy
will therefore have little effect on the level of imports of beef
casings. It is expected, however, that the European market for casings
will decrease with the increased future popularity of artificial
casings.
Canned beef, with a 26 percent ad valorem tariff and Import
certificate and deposit requirements, could be greatly restricted in
the future if the Common Market countries should choose to make their
policy restrictionist* In the 1962 calendar year, the Common Market
imported prepared and canned meat valued at $26,814,000. The United
States exported $1,363,000 of this total. However, canned beef exports
to the EEC, according to Table 9 from the United States, amounted to
only $26,000. Such a loss to the United States would be almost
negligible.
Poland exported $4,939,000 worth of canned meat to the EEC, while
Argentina exported $2,448,000. Exports of prepared and canned meats
from Dermark amounted to $1,025,000.^ It is obvious that the Common
Market could reduce these imports to practically nothing, if it chooses
to foster beef and veal production within its own borders at the ex
pense of present exporting nations.
Argentiaa is an important supplier of meat extracts and juices.
In the 1962 calendar year, it exported meat extracts and juices valued
at $7,471,000 to the EEC. This was 54,1 percent of the $13,821,000
worth of this commodity imported by the EEC in 1962, Argentina also
supplied the major portion of dried, salted and smoked offals imported
by the EEC in 1962. Its exports of $2,589,000 were 69.2 percent of
total EEC imports of $3,739,000.^
^Foreign Trade ^atistics. Analytical Tables
December, 1962, o£. cit.. p. 21.
^Ibid.
- Imports. January-
Imports of Feed Grains by the European Economic Community
As explained In Chapter VX, the European Economic Community's
coDHDon agricultural policy is to be centered on grains. If the policy
is to be liberal, then the target prices for grains will be relatively
low, and the variable import levy will not be excessive. If the Common
Market should decide to protect its farmers from foreign competition
in grains, then it will have high target prices, nearer the present
German price than those of the relatively low French price, and imports
will be seriously restricted.
What happens to the price of feed grains will have a great im
pact on the Community's production of cattle* If prices for feed grains
are high because of protectionist policies, then farmers will continue
to use much of their land for feed grain production. Although cattle
prices would be high with such a policy, the cost of feeding livestock
would also Increase, and cattle production would not be greatly
expanded. This would cause relatively high beef prices which would
naturally attract foreign exporters. However, with a protectionist
policy, beef and veal Imports by the Community would be seriously
curtailed. The high prices for these comnodities would reduce consumer
demand for beef and veal, and the constant or slightly increased
domestic production would be able to meet the reduced demand.
If the target prices of feed grains are set at a relatively low
level, on the other hand, domestic producers will be discouraged from
continuing production of feed grains. They will use their land for
hay and graases:.' for livestock feeding, and use the poorer, land for
grazing cattle. Imports of low priced feed grains from third coun*
tries will rise, and will make livestock production less expensive.
Cattle feeding would no doubt continue to become more popular, as has
been the trend in the past in the European nations.
Table 15 shows that the Community supplied only 78.1 percent
of its feed grain requirements. It is 85.1 percent self-sufficient
in total grains because of its great production of wheat. It is self-
sufficient in soft wheats, and imports only quality hard wheats,
mainly from Canada and the United States for milling purposes. If the
United Kingdom were now to become a member, the Community would be only
74.0 percent self-sufficient in feed grain production. With the addition
of Ireland, Denmark and Norway as well to the Community, the Ten would
produce 74.4 percent of their needs, which is not quite three-quarters
of their requirements. Therefore the Community as presently constituted,
or with all applicants as members would still find it difficult to
becon» entirely self-sufficient in feed grains.
However, feed grain yields per acre have been steadily Increasing,
and production has been rising throughout Europe. Average yields rose
by approximately 37 percent between 1950-52 and 1960-62, with a 61 per
cent increase in French grain production alone.^ There is still much
Kenneth L. Murray, 'Trends and Projections of EEC Production
and Consumption," Grain and Feed Division, Foreign Agricultural Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C., 1963, Table 4.
Table 15. Imports of Grains by the Common Market and
Prospective Members, 1959-60
Coarse grains:
Production
Availability
Self-sufficiency, percent
Total grains:
Production
Availability
Self-sufficiency, percent
EEC "Seven" "Eight" "Ten"
- - - - - 1000 metric tons - - - -
27,220 33,817 37,586 38,935
34,871 4J5,678 50,597 52,347
78.1 74.0 74.3 74.4
53,114 62,543 66,677 68,412
62,994 80,807 86,204 89,001
85.1 77.4 77.3 76.8
Source: European Economic Coiomunlty, Official Spokesman of the
Community, "The Common Agricultural Policy • Protectionist
or Liberal?", Information Memo, Brussels, February 1962,
Statistical Annexes, p. 2.
land In pasture that could be converted to feed grains if the need
arose. A surplus in wheat production is expected. In the future, high
price Incentives could persuade European farmers to produce feed grains
rather than producing a surplus of wheat. Thus it is feasible for the
Common Market to become much more self-sufficient In the production of
feed grains than it presently Is. Nevertheless, this does not alter
the fact that the relative physical capacities for feed grain
production In present exporting nations such as the United States are
much greater than those of the Common Market.
In the 1962 calendar year, the EEC nations Imported 11,779,000
metric tons of feed grains from third countries, valued at $680,000.
United States exports to the Common Market amounted to 5,928,000 tons,
worth $331,216,000 and accounted for 45.4 percent of feed grain Imports
by the Six. Other important exporters to the Community included
Argentina with 2^823,000 metric tons, Commonwealth countries with
1,389,000 tons and South Africa, with 708,000 tons of feed grain
exports to the Six.^
The United Kingdom in 1962 imported 5,689,000 tons of feed
grains. The United States again was the largest feed grain supplier
to the United Kingdom. United States exports totaled 3,143,000 metric
tons worth $173,748,000^. This was 55.3 percent of total feed grain
imports by the United Kingdom. Other importers, though much less
important included Canada, South Africa, Argentina and Australia.
Ireland, Denmark and Norway imported 1,012,000 metric tons of
feed grains in the 1961 calendar year,^ Thus total feed grain imports
by the Ten amounted to about 19,768.000 metric tons. Value of these
imports was approximately $1,112,000. The other five applicants for
associate membership had a net export balance of 902,800 metric tons
in 1961 according to the 1962 FAO Yearbook.'*
Foreign I^^e Statistics, Analytical - Imports, January-
December, 1962, op. clt.,.pp. 27^2^^
2 C. Clive Lawrence, Assistant to Agricultural and Food Attache,
British Embassy, Letter to Author Containing British Trade Figures for
Cattle, Beef Products and Feed Grains, 1962, Washington D.C., October
3, 1963.
3 .Figures from Irish and Danish Embassies, Washington D.C.,
October 1963, and from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, Trade Yearbook 1961, Rome, 1962, pp. 89-98.
^rade Yearbook 1962, op. clt., pp. 89-98.
Table 16. Sumnary of Estimated Effects of Alternate
EEC Price Policies on Net Grain Balance, 1970
Increase or Decrease from Projection Assuming
I. Continu- Continuation of National Policies^
ation II, EEC Policy III. EEC Policy IV. EEC Policy
of National & German Grain & Av. Germ.-Fr. & French Price
Policies Price Level Price Level Level
million metric tons -
Production -4.5 -3.0 -0.9
Consumption -0.9 0 +0.9
Bet effect on
EEC Imports -5.4 -3.0 0
EEC Imports
in 1970 11.2 5 fi « n no
Minuses refer to effect of Increased production or decreased consump*
tion. Plus refers to effects of decreased production or increased
consumption.
^If EEC exports are eliminated, gross imports would be reduced by an
additional 2.1 million bushels.
Source: Elmer W. Learn, "Long-Term Effects of Conmon Market Grain
Policies," Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States
United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul
tural Service, January 1963, pp. 10 and 15.
The FAO made projections for EEC production, consumption and
import re<]ulrements for 1970 under the assumption that population would
grow at the rate of 0,7 percent per year, and that per capita income
in the EEC would continue at the same rate of growth as in the past,
which has been 4.7 percent. Also it was assumed that the national ag
ricultural policies would remain essentially the same as in the base
period, 1958,^ The conclusions at which it arrived were that the
The "1958" period is the 1957-59 average.
import requirements would rise from the 1958 level of 7,400,000 metric
tons to 11,200,000 metric tons in 1970. If the United Kingdom were to
become a member of the Community before 1970, import requirements of
coarae grains for the enlarged Community would be 15,700,000 metric
tons.
However, this will not be the case if a common agricultural
policy is followed. Table 16 shows that if the EEC assumes a protec
tionist policy for its farmers by establishing the target price at the
German price level, which is the highest of any member country, that
production within the Community will increase 4,500,000 metric'tons,
and that consumption of feed grains will decrease 900,000 metric tons
because of the higher price. It is expected that all increases in
feed grain production would come in France. West Germany, the Benelux
countries and Italy are already producing the maximum amount possible.
It is difficult for them to increase acreage, and so even though prices
are higher they will be unable to produce more feed grains. France,
on the other hand, still has up to five million acres in pasture and
grassland and fallow, and if the German price became the Community
price, the price Increase would be great enough to Induce French farmers
to employ much of this idle land for feed grain production.
Elmer W. Learn, *'Long-Term Effects of Common Market Grain
Policies," Foreign Agriculture ^ the United States. United States
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, January 1963,
Table 3, p. 10.
Of course such a price Increase throughout the Comnunity would
make livestock production more expensive. Land which had formerly been
used for cattle grazing would be used to a considerable extent for
feed grain production, and the cost of feeding cattle would be greater.
This Is true to an even greater extent for other livestock animals.
It was assumed by the FAG that grain costs represent 50
percent of total farm value of hogs, poultry and eggs and 10
percent of total value for cattle and milk. Thus a given per
centage change In grain prices resulted in a percentage change
in farm level prices half as great for the former commodities
and one-tenth as great for the latter.^
Of course, this means that the price of pork and poultry would
rise relative to that for beef, so while the demand for meats as a
whole would fall, it is to be expected that demand for beef would not
fall as much.
If the average of the French and German price levels Is to be
used as the target price for feed grains by the EEC, then Imports of
feed grains will fall by 3,000,000 metric tons from the 1970 FAO
projected level of Imports. The average French-German threshold price
would cause the same level of livestock product consumption as would
a continuation of national policies. Yet, grain production would In
crease in the Community by the aforementioned total because the French-
German average price la above that of the French and this would provide
some incentive to FYench farmers to produce more feed grains. If the
French level were to prevail, on the other hand, then neither production
Elmer W. Learn, o£. clt., p. 17.
Coarse
grains
Table 17, United States Grain Exports to the EEC
Countries Under Selected Conditions, 1970
United States Exports in 1970 Under Condition
1. Continu- II. EEC III, EEC IV. EEC
ation Policy Policy Policy
of National & Cennan & Av, Genn-Fr, & Fr,
"1958" Policies Price Level Price Level Price Lev<
- million metric tons -
Source; Elmer W, Learn, "Long-Term Effects of Common Market Grain
Policies," Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States,
United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul-
tural Service, January 1963, p. 19.
nor consumption would change at all from the FAG projection, because
the price level in France would remain unchanged. The French level
of price, even though it is well above the world c.i.f. price, never
theless is the lowest price in the Community, and if the Common Market
set its, target price at the French level, this policy would have to
be regarded, at least in contrast to a German price level, as liberal.
Now it is necessary to determine exactly how much the United
States will be affected by these various policies. What was described
above refers to effects on all exporting nations. However, it must
be remembered that the United States is the most important supplier
of feed grains to the EEC. Table 17 summarizes the effects of the
various policies on the United States alone.
According to Table 17, prepared by the Economic Research Service
of the USDA, imports of the EEC from the United States in 1970 would
rise from 2,900,000 tons In "1958" to 3,700,000 tons, under the condi
tion that present agricultural policies in the individual nations were
continued. If the French price is used instead, imports from the
United States would be exactly the same in 1970 as they were in the
"1958" period, though less than they were in 1962, If the German
price level Is used, however, imports from the United States would fall
to 600,000 metric tons, which is 2,300,000 tons below the level of
imports at the French price, A protectionist Common Market, it can
be said, will cause the United States to lose over 2,000,000 metric
tons of feed grain exports yearly. If the French-German average price
is used, imports from the United States in 1970 would amount to
1,200,000 metric tons. This is 1,700,000 tons less than would be
imported from the United States with French prices, yet it means that
600,000 tons more than at the German levels of price would be exported
by the United States. Such an average price must be regarded as
restrictionist, and the United States stands to lose a great deal if
this price level is enforced by the CAP.
Concerning effects of American exports of feed grains under an
enlarged protectionist Community, Dr. Learn said, "Until other details
are known, it does seem reasonable to conclude that the enlargement of
the Comnunity will not alter the nature of the conclusions cited earlier,"^
In other words, exports to the six nations would still be approximately
^Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, op. cit., p, 21,
the same under the various assumptions even though present applicants
for membership joined the Community. However, a restrictionist policy
would mean that production of feed grains in the four countries which
have applied for membership would be greater and consumption of these
grains would be less, and therefore they too would take less imports
of feed grains from the United States.
Exactly what this would mean to the United States cattlemen can**
not be definitely computed, but It is certain that if the United States
lost 1,700,000 to 2,300,000 metric tons of feed grains to the six
member nations annually, and upward of one-third of this in addition
if the four applicants for full membership were admitted, tremendous
surpluses would develop within the United States, and prices of feed
grains in the United States would fall. Less land would be used for
feed grain production in the United States and more land would be used
for grazing. It is to be expected that this would induce cattlemen
to produce more beef and veal. However, a fall in feed grain prices
would mean that the consumer prices for competing meats such as pork
and poultry would fall relatively more than that of beef. Thus demand
for competing meats would increase relative to that for beef and veal.
As will be later seen, such a policy would bring attempts by foreign
exporters to develop greater markets for their beef and veal in the
United States, and the United States cattlemam, with his increased
production and lowered price would possibly have to face greater compe
tition from foreign imports of beef and veal as well. Under such
circumatancea, It appears certain that the cattlemen in the United
States would be adversely affected. However, a much more thorough
study would be required to come to definite conclusions concerning the
degree and extent of such a situation. Such a study is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Projections to 1970 for Beef and Veal Imports by
the European Economic Community
It was explained earlier in this chapter that the two main
United States exports from beef cattle sources, tallow and greases and
hides and skins, would be. little affected by the Community's CAP for
cattle and beef products because these commodities will enjoy almost
perfect freedom of entry into the Common Market, The only export com
modity from beef sources presently going to the Community from the
United States which may be seriously curtailed in the future is variety
meats. Even this is unlikely because of GAIT agreements made by the
United States with the EEC in 1962 which stipulated that increased
restrictions on variety meats by the EEC could be met by retaliation
by the exporters affected. Table 7 in Chapter IV showed that variety
meats from beef sources were valued at $8,553,000 in 1962. Exports by
the United States to the United Kingdom in 1962 of variety meats
amounted to $3,678,000. Imports by these two areas from the United
States made up almost all of United States exports of variety meats.
It was also previously concluded that imports of variety meats by the
EEC or the United Kingdom would not Increase significantly by 1970
even if present national policies were continued.
Exports by the United States of beef and veal to the Community
in 1962 were almost negligible. These exports amounted in value to
only $92,000. The loss of this market would have very little adverse
effect on the United States beef cattle industry. Yetv although it
would appear from what has been said above that any future common agri
cultural policy for beef and beef products will have very little if any
hearing on United States cattlemen, such is not the case. It is
true that United States exports of these commodities, outside of
possibly variety meats, will not be seriously affected by the Community's
policy. The same cannot, however, be said for imports Into the United
States of these same products.
Although the United States exports very little beef and veal
to the Six or Ten, these countries arc important markets for the beef
and veal exports of other major exporting nations. The most important
United States livestock import commodity is beef and veal. In 1962,
the United States imported UkO,kOO metric tons of beef and veal from
foreign sources. If a protectionist CAP restricts future exports of
beef and veal by these foreign exporters to the Community, there would
be a concerted attempt on the part of these exporters to redirect much
of the beef and veal exports which formerly went to the EEC, to the
American market instead.
Since hides and skins and tallow and beef casings will be un
affected by the CAP, and since no country outside Europe exports live
cattle in large numbers to the EEC, the only important trade item that
may be affected by the CAP of the Common Market is beef and veal.
Therefore, projections of beef and veal imports alone by the Community
will be necessary. Projected production by the Community of beef and
veal will, of course, indicate the level of beef cattle by-products
that the Community can expect to produce by the year 1970.
Con8un5>tion has been growing faster than production in the Com
mon Market countries in the 1950*8. In the period 1950-51 to 1952-53,
for example, the Community members were 95.5 percent self-sufficient
in their production of beef and veal and imported only 105,000 metric
tons from other countries.^ By "1958**, however, these same six
countries were only 92,3 percent self-sufficient in beef and veal pro
duction, and they imported 258,000 tons of beef and veal from other
countries.
Among the six countries, the French and Dutch are presently net
exporters of beef and veal. The Belgium-Luxembourg Union is pretty
well self-sufficient in the production of bovine meats. Only West
Germany and Italy are net importers of beef and veal. Table 13 showed
that in 1962, these six countries imported 247,800 tons from other
^EEC Commission Mimeograph Copy of *'Agricultural Projections
for 1970,*' Brussels, 1963, Tableau n. IV/7, p. IV/17.
countries, but only 149,000 from third countries, that is from non-
member countries.
According to a study made by the EEC Commission, consumption
by 1970 will increase by 44.2 percent if the rate of income growth is
weak, and by 52.8 percent if the rate of income growth continues to
be strong as it has been in the past. Production, on the other hand,
will depend somewhat on the methods of production the farmers use in
the future and on their incentives to increase beef production. If,
for example, the aim of the farmers is to stablize cattle numbers, to
reduce slaughter of calves in favor of future increases, and to use
new techniques, production of beef and veal wills increase in the EEC
by 54.4 percent to 70.8 percent by 1970. If, on the other hand, farmers
are slow to take up new methods of beef production, and continue to
slaughter many calves, the production is expected to increase by 55.2
percent.^
Table 18 shows that under different assumptions, imports of beef
and veal in 1970 could vary from 30,000 tons to 314,000 tons, depending
on the growth in income. If income growth is weaker than in the past,
that is, if the Community does not expand as it did in the past, then
it will be almost self-sufficient in beef and veal production. Citi
zens of the Community would consume less than would have been the case
^EEC Commission, Mimeograph Copy of "Agricultural Projections
for 1970," Brussels, 1963, pp. IV/16-22.
Table 18. Projections to 1970 for EEC Production
Consunption and Net Import Requirements
Production
Variation in
stocks
Net Imports (-)
Net exports (-)
Difference
Consumption
Degree of self-
sufficiency (%)
1958"
3,025
♦5
38h
126
+258
3,285
92.3
Constant Suj ~
of Cattle-
Income Growth
Weak
ipjly
Stroni
Increasing Supply
of Cattle^
Income Growth
Weak
• • 1,000 tons carcass weight
4,682 4,682 4,707 4,707
+55 +339 +30
98.8 93.2 93.7
Increase in number of grown calves compared to "1958", and production
according to new methods.
No increase in number of grown calves compared to 1958, and production
according to traditional methods.
Source: EEC Commission, Mimeograph Copy of "Agricultural Projections
for 1970," Brussels, 1963, Tableau n. IV/9, p. IV/20.
with increased strong growth in incomes, and farmers would be able to
supply their needs. Only 30,000 to 55,000 tons of imports of beef and
veal would be required. If Incomes continue to increase at the same
rate as has been true in the past (and it was assumed, in dealing with
feed grains that they would), the import requirements would be from
314,000 to 339,000 tons, depending on the methods of production the
Community cattlemen employ.
A price Increase in beef and veal can be assumed to have much
the same effect as would a decrease in Income. Therefore, it is
conceivable that with strong income growth in the EEC and a common
agricultural policy agreed on by the EEC members for beef and veal to
be very protectionist, the domestic price of beef and veal would be
high enough so that production would be Increased and demand would be
decreased to such an extent that beef and veal imports from third
countries would be virtually excluded. It is possible that 30,000 to
55,000 tons as shown in Table 18 would be imported. If the Conmunity
does not restrict imports to any greater degree than was true in the
past, and if it favors no serious price increases, then the projections
made by the EEC Cofmnission for 1970 will likely be approximately cor
rect. In that case, 314,000 to 339,000 tons of beef and veal will be
imported by the EEC in 1970.
Effects of a Protectionist Six-Member
EEC on the United States
A protectionist Common Market could, according to the discussion
above, restrict approximately 284,000 metric tons of beef and veal from
entering its ports in 1970. In other words, 284,000 metric tons of
beef and veal that would have been exported to the Six, if national
policies were continued as they are today, would be restricted entry
by a protectionist CAP in the year 1970, This would mean surpluses of
beef and veal in the exporting nations which presently supply the Six
with their import requirements for beef and veal.
Table 13 ahowed that among third country exporters of beef and
veal to the Six, imports from Argentina alone made up 58,9 percent of
total imports, Danish exports constituted 19.7 percent of the Commu-
nigy'a imports and Uruguay accounted for 6,2 percent of total Coim&unity
imports. Brazil had 3,2 percent, Ireland had 1.2 percent and New
Zealand had only 0,07 percent of exports of beef and veal to the
Common Market in 1962, On the assumption that these countries will
hold the same share of the EEC market in 1970 as they did in 1962,
Argentina will stand to lose most by a protectionist policy. Of the
284,000 tons in losses, Argentina's share would be 167,276 tons.
Denmark's would be 55,948 tons. Uruguay's 17,608 tons, Brazil's losses
would be 9,088 metric tons, and Ireland's, 3,408 tons. Losses by New
Zealand would be practically negligible.
Whether or not it would be possible, in such a situation, for
these exporting nations to redirect any of their exports of beef and
veal to the United States is a question which must be given careful
consideration. As it now stands, none of these countries whose exports
would be restricted by a protectionist CAP exports a significant amount
of its total beef and veal exports to the United States, except for
Ireland. Argentina accounts for only 4,7 percent of United States
imports of beef and veal. Only salted beef is imported by the United
States from Argentina, All other meat imports are prohibited because
of hoof*and-mouth disease in Argentina, Denmark exports no beef and
veal to the United States, according to Table 5, Chapter III, Beef and
veal imports from Uruguay totaled only 3.1 percent of total United
States imports of this product in 1962. Thus, it would appear that
since these exporting nations did not have markets in the United States
in 1962, it would be difficult for them to develop large markets in
the United States for their beef and veal exports by 1970, and they
would have to look to other countries of the world to export their
surpluses. Upon this reasoning, it could be concluded that just as
was found to be the case with exports, so it would be true that imports
of beef and veal would be adversely affected by the Common Market to
a very small degree, if at all.
However, it is not true that Argentina and other Latin American
exporters have not been traditional exporters of beef and veal to the
United States. In the 1951-55 period, Argentina alone accounted for
about half of the total exports of beef and veal to the United States.
Imports from Argentina were then severely restricted by the United
States because of hoof-and-mouth disease in Argentina, and Argentine
exports dropped drastically. The Argentine government has now begun a
very thorough program to vaccinate all beef cattle against this disease.
The export Inspection standards established are internationally recog
nized, so it is very likely that by 1970 all American objections to
imports of beef and veal from Argentina, on grounds of sanitation at
least, will be gone.
Furthermore, exports of beef and veal are very important to the
econoioy of Argentina, and to a lesser extent, to the econ<Miiies of
Uruguay and Brazil• Drastic declines in export tnarkets because of a
protectionist EEC policy would deal a serious blow to the economies
of these Latin American countries. It is very likely that these
countries would turn to their hemispheric "big brother" to get them
out of their economic dilemma by importing some of their beef and veal
surpluses. It is likely that for political reasons, the United States
would agree to increase imports of beef and veal from these countries
if their meat met United States import standards. United States*
desire to foster closer hemispheric relations through the Organization
of American States (OAS) would be an important factor, as would be the
desire for success of the **Alliance for Progress" program. This is
not to say that the United States would automatically step in and buy
all Latin American surpluses, but rather, that it is likely that the
United States would import beef and veal from Argentina and to a lesser
degree, from Uruguay and Brazil, in greater quantities than has been
true in the past. It would also mean that much high quality meat would
be entering the United States at relatively low prices.
Denmark does not have a traditional market for beef and veal
exports in the United States, and it is unlikely, should it be excluded
from EEC trade in beef and veal, that it would attempt to develop a
large market in the United States. Rather, in all likelihood, it would
try to build up bigger markets in the other EFTA nations. The United
Kingdom would be an especially attractive market. However, this would
mean that it would be competing with such exporters to the United
Kingdom as Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland. Losses
suffered by these latter countries because of Danish competition would
also possibly be redirected to the attractive United States market.
Since the United States is the most important market for Irish
exports of beef and veal, losses in the Community would naturally be
attempted to be redirected to the United States. Increasing exports
to the United States would almost certinly be one of the first steps
Ireland would take to prevent adverse effects on its beef industry.
It is impossible to predict perfectly, the new international
patterns of trade that would result from each of the various EEC agri*.
cultural trade policies. They can only be estimated, and there are
many possible ways of estimating how much will be redirected from the
Common Market and to where. One possible manner of determining the
portion of the surpluses resulting from protectionist EEC policies
which would be redirected to the United States, would be to assume that
the United States* imports of these surpluses would be approximately
the same as is the present United States share of world imports of beef
and veal, exclusive of the six EEC member nations. Table 2, Chapter
II shows that the United States in 1961 imported 36 percent of world
imports of beef and veal, if the six Common Market nations are not taken
If United States imported 36 percent of surplus ex
ports resulting from Community protectionism, it would import 102,000
additional tons of beef and veal in 1970. Total United States imports
in 1962 of beef and veal amounted to approximately 440,hOO metric tons.
If 1962 United States values for beef and veal Imports are used, the
amount excluded from the CosBnon Market would be approximately
$200,000,000, and the value of beef and veal exported to the United
States would be 36 percent of this or $71,000,000. Actually, this
figure of 36 percent cannot be considered excessive because present
United States imports of beef and vealacecunt for over 50 percent of
world trade,^ Thus, it could well be that more than 36 percent of
the surplus exports would be sent to the United States.
Effects of Protectionist Enlarged EEC on the United States
According to a study by the Institute for Research of Oxford
University, England, the United Kingdom will import 461,000 tons of
beef and veal in 1970. Argentina and Australia will each supply
155,000 tons of beef and veal, and New Zealand will export 121,000 tons
of beef and veal to the United Kingdom.^ Thus if the United Kingdom
and the three other applicants for full membership are within the
Community by 1970, effects of a protectionist policy will be much more
severe for beef and veal exporting nations, and for United States
^Raymond A. loanes. Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, Talk to 41st Annual Agricul
tural Outlook Conference, Washington D.C., November 18, 1963, p. 5.
2 Institute for Research of Oxford University, United Kingdom
Projected Level of Demand, Supply and Imports of Farm Production, 1965
and 1970, U.S.D.A,, Economic Research Service, Foreign-19, Washington
D.C,, January 1962, p. 98.
cattlemen who will be submitted to increased competition from lower-
priced foreign surpluses of beef and veal. If Increased beef produc
tion within the Ten is fostered by high prices and restrictive levies,
then production in Denmark, Ireland and Norway will be increased
substantially. It is likely that Denmark especially, an important
exporter, would find greater markets within the Community and especially
in the United Kingdom, and would reduce exports to countries such as
Spain and East Germany and concentrate on filling the production-
consumption gap within the Community.
Such higher prices would reduce demand in the United Kingdom,
just as it would provide incentive for increased production. Imports
would not therefore be nearly as great as was projected by the Oxford
study. Also imports would be filled to a much greater degree by
countries such as Denmark. Thus it is very possible that the United
Kingdom*s level of beef and veal imports would be nearer the 1962 level
of imports, which was 332,300 tons than the projected 1970 level of
468,000 tons. Such a situation would result in approximately 136,000
tons less in exports to the United Kingdom than was anticipated, and
presumably that much less than exporting nations will be able to supply.
In this case, countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina
would need to seek new markets for these exports* According to pro
jections by the governments of New Zealand and Australia, these Common
wealth countries will have increased supplies of beef and veal for
exports By 1970. New Zealand expects beef and veal available for
exports in 1970 to be up 23 percent over the 1957-60 period,^ Aus
tralian exports will probably increase at an even faster rate. If the
United Kingdom became a member of the Community, these two countries
would lose the trade preferences which they enjoy under the Commonwealth
system. The greater part of beef and veal exports from both these
nations now goes to the United States* Any loss suffered by them in
the British market would therefore be met by attempting to develop even
greater markets In the United States.
Thus it would not be unrealistic to suppose again that the
United States would import about 36 percent of these surpluses* If
this were the case, then the United States imports would increase about
U9,000 metric tons, because of protectionism* Adding this to the
amount entering the United States because of decreased imports by the
Six, it may be concluded that approximately 151,000 metric tons of beef
and veal would enter the United States because of a restrictionist
Common Market policy. Using 1962 United States import values, about
$34,000,000 would be excluded by the United Kingdom and approximately
$105,000,000 by the Ten.
Of course, if all nations that have applied for associate mem
bership as well were to join the Common Market, a protectionist market
would cause an even greater disruption, for increased production would
be promoted in most Western European countries, and beef and veal demand
^Department of Industries and Commerce, The Role of the Meat
Producers* Board, R. E. Owen Govt, Printer, Wellington, New Zealand,
1963, p. 8*
would not be as large as would otherwise be the case because of in
creased prices. Therefore, import requirements would be less.
It should be stated, however, that such a protectionist policy
is not likely if the four applicants for membership are admitted into
the Community, The United Kingdom has a tradition of low food prices
and great imports of cheap feed grains and meats. It is udlikely that
the consumers of the United Kingdom would tolerate for long a govern
ment that would condone great price increases in foods merely for the
sake of self-sufficiency and the protection of other European farmers.
It is almost certain, however, that if the United Kingdom were to join
the Common Market, prices of beef and veal and feed grains would be
greater in the United Kingdom than they have been in the past.
Effects of a Liberal Six-Member EEC on the United States
Under a liberal CAP, large amounts of feed grains would continue
to be imported by the Common Market countries from the United States,
Feed grain producers in the United States would not be at all adversely
affected by the common agricultural policy. Indeed, this profitable
export trade would continue to be the source of a good portion of their
farm incomes. Prices in the United States would, therefore, not fall
because of the CAP and it could well be that the American farmers could
thank the free trading Comnunity to a large extent for keeping prices
up by importing so much of the United States* surplus feed grains. As
explained before, these relatively high feed grain prices would not
hurt cattle producers in the United States«
In the EEC, cattle production would increase because a liberal
CAP which would allow cheap feed grain imports to enter the Community,
Demand, which would also be high because of the lower prices of beef
and veal, would not be satisfied by domestic production, as explained
in Table 18 and exports to the Community from third countries would
continue at the same high level. As a matter of fact, if the EEC mar
ket looked especially good to exporters, countries such as Australia
and New Zealand might be induced to increase exports to the area. This
would shift some Oceanic exports from the United States to Europe, and
United States cattlemen would have less competition within the United
States,
It must therefore be concluded that if the Community has low
target prices and a small import levy, the United States cattlemen will
not be hurt by the CAP, but will in all probability be financially
helped. The exact amount of benefits in either quantitative or value
terms will not be estimated in this study. It will be enough to con
clude that United States cattlemen will themselves profit by a healthy
and strong demand for feed grains and cattle and beef products in the
Community.
Effects of an Enlarged Liberal EEC on the United States
Much the same conclusions must be drawn if an enlarged Community
follows a free-trading course in its relations with other nations.
Allowing feed grains, beef and beef products to enter the Coismunity at
low prices would increase European consumption, and imports. Cattlemen
in the United States could not but look favorably on such a Comnunity.
This type of situation would be favorable to them, just as it would
be to the United States economy, and indeed to the economies of the
nations of the free world. To promote such an European Economic Com
munity is the task of the United States beef cattle and agricultural
interests, for an integrated North Atlantic agricultural community
would be a great boon to the agricultural economy of the United States,
just as it would be to the consumers of the Common Market.
In order, then, to foster liberalization of the CAP and to pre
vent market losses and increased competition because of restrictionist
Common Market policies, the United States cattle interests must support
the United States government In its negotiations for liberalizing
agricultural as well as industrial trade with the Common Market in the
GATT negotiations at Geneva. The United States trade negotiators are
going to have to be firm in their demands for greater freedom of agri
cultural as well as industrial trade with the Community. Only by such
hard bargaining can the United States cattlemen expect to find a lib
eral agricultural policy in the EEC by 1970 and the years thereafter.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE COMMON MARKET AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES ON SOUTH DAKOTA
The effects of each one of the courses which it will be possible
for the European Economic Community to follow in the future in its
common agricultural policy, on the United States beef cattle industry,
was estimated in Chapter VII• Now it is necessary to attempt to deter
mine to what extent the effects on the United States beef cattle
industry will affect the South Dakota cattlemen. As in Chapter VII,
each of the alternatives will be considered separately.
The Effects on South Dakota of a Six-Member EEC with
a Protectionist Common Agricultural Policy
If the members of the Community decide to develop a protectionist
agricultural policy, the target prices and variable levies on beef and
feed grains will be high, and exports will be restricted. What would
this mean for South Dakota cattlemen? It would mean that in the United
States, there would probably be hardly any adverse effects on United
States exports, but that the import situation would be worse from the
cattlemen's point of view. Outside of imports of cattle and calves
from Canada and Mexico, beef and veal is the only really important
cattle and beef product import item. Under a protectionist policy,
about 102,000 metric tons of beef and veal valued at approximately
$71,000,000 would be sent to the United States,
since South Dakota sales of cattle and calves for beef purposes
are expected to account for four percent of national sales, the South
Dakota cattlemen's share of the effects of the competition of these
imports would be approximately four percent. Therefore, the direct
effects of these imports on beef and veal in South Dakota would be
about $2,900,000.
The projected gross cash Income for South Dakota cattlemen in
1970 was $450,640,000. Therefore, the increase in imports resulting
from EEC protectionism would take away about two-thirds of one percent
of the 1970 gross income of cattle ranchers and feeders in South Dakota*
However, net Incomes from cattle in 1961 were only $60,765,000, while
gross incomes from cattle in the same year were $277,472,000.^ This
means that gross income was 4,6 times that of net income. Since the
costs of cattle production for South Dakota cattlemen would not decrease,
the percentage figure of two-thirds of one percent of losses in gross
income would have to be multiplied by 4.6 to arrive at the percentage
losses in net income. In other words, such a restrictionist policy
could be expected to bring about a decrease in net income of approxi
mately three percent.
An almost $3,000,000 loss in sales is serious, even though it
appears to be small when spread out among all cattlemen in the state.
It should be noted that this takes away about $3,000,000 in spending
^South Dakota Agriculture, 1962, op. cit., p. 48.
power from the cattle ranchers and feeders, and a good part as much
from other people in the state who otherwise would have received much
of this $3,000,000 from the purchases of the cattlemen, and would have
respent this again* Their incomes will be lower as well* This multi
plier effect means that the loss of about $3,000,000 because of compe
tition from imported beef would in reality amount to a considerably
larger loss*^ Of course, if most of the reduction were in manufacturing
Bkeata, then the cattlemen would lose none of their market for quality
meats, and they might be very little affected by this policy,
A protectionist six-member policy by the Common Market would
mean that surpluses of feed grains would accrue in the United States,
For reasons explained in earlier chapters, lower feed grain prices would
benefit hog and poultry producers at the expense of cattlemen. There
fore, South Dakota cattlemen and the South Dakota economy would be
adversely affected by lower feed grain prices, just as they would be
hurt by increased imports.
Effects on South Dakota of an Enlarged EEC with
a Protectionist Common Agricultural Policy
If the four applicants for full membership should become part
of the Common Market by 1970, and if it is their decision to follow a
protectionist policy, effects will be even more harmful to the South
^For a definition of the "multiplier effect," see the Glossary
of Terms, Appendix A,
Dakota cattlemen and economy than those discussed above. As before,
exports of the United States would be relatively unaffected, but a
protectionist ten-member Community would mean that even more beef and
veal would be kept out of the EEC and redirected to the United States.
Under these conditions, 151,000 metric tons of beef and veal worth
$105,000,000 would be redirected to the United States. If, as before,
it is assumed that South Dakota's share of competition from these
Increased imports will be four percent, then this will mean that South
Dakota cattlemen will be affected to the extent of $4,200,000. This
Is equal to 0.94 percent of 1970 gross cash incomes to cattlemen in
the state. In other words, about one percent of gross cash incomes
would be lost directly because of the restrictionist common agricultural
policy. Approximately 4.3 percent of net incomes to South Dakota
cattlemen would be lost.
Feed grain surpluses would be even larger than under a six-member
protectionist agricultural policy, so South Dakota cattlemen and the
South Dakota economy would be hurt even more by grain surpluses under
the ten member protectionism than under the six-member protectionism.
Effects on South Dakota of a Six-Member EEC with a
Liberal Common Agricultural Policy
If, on the other hand, the Common Market should become a com
munity of the type envisaged by Jean Monnet, Robert Scjhuman, Paul
Henri ^aak and others, then effects on the South Dakota cattlemen and
South Dakota economy would be entirely different. If it turns out
that the Community becomes a six member free trading bloc, eager to
strengthen economic and military ties between the nations of the North
Atlantic Community, trade will grow and exporters and consumers will
prosper. The outlook in the Community for United States exports of
tallow and hides and skins would be excellent. There would be tio
government-inspired redirection of EEC Imports 6f beef and i^aal to the
United States. It would appear reasonable to assume that such a
Community would be more economically sound, more stable and more
prosperous than would an isolated EEC. This huge market would there
fore almost certainly be extremely attractive to world exporters of
beef cattle products and feed grains. Such an EEC could not be at all
blamed for any United States feed grain surpluses. These large grain
exports would be to the South Dakota cattlemen's advantage.
Effects on South Dakota of an Enlarged EEC with
a Liberal Common Agricultural Policy
An enlarged free-trade orientated EEC would offer the same
advantages to the South Dakota farmer and rancher as would a six-member
liberal Common Market, but on a magnified scale. The huge United King
dom market would be assured to traditional exporters of beef and veal
and they would not have to look to the United States to take their
surpluses of beef and veal. Prices would be high enough in the ten
countries to lure a great deal of exports of beef and ireal from the
exporting nations• This would possibly at least slightly lessen the
level o£ exports of this commodity to the United States, and would
tend to mitigate foreign competition for United States domestic
producers*
The United Kingdom would also continue its high level of feed
grain imports, thus keeping prices up within the United States, and
tending to keep the prices of pork and poultry fairly high so that
their competition with beef would be at a minimum.
Possible Areas for Further Study
This thesis has dealt with a very broad and general area of
study* It has not been possible to deal with many of the problems
raised in each of the chapters in full detail. There would be much
to be gained by exploring these problems in the future in order to come
to a better understanding of what effects changes in trade, and changes
in the common agricultural policy of the EEC in particular, can have
on an industry such as the United States beef cattle industry, or even
on the people within a region of the country, such as South Dakota.
Some of the more obvious unanswered problems raised in this
thesis are listed below.
1, What is the exact effect on the price of beef cattle, from
imports of beef? In other words, how much is the price of beef lowered
because of imports?
2, To what degree do present In^orta of manufacturing beef and
veal compete with higher quality domestically produced beef?
3. To What degree would feed grain prices be affected by the
various Common Market agricultural policies?
h. Exactly what effects do the prices of feed grains in the
United States have on prices and production of the various meats,
including beef?
5. What course of action or policy by the United States govern
ment for each of the various EEC common agricultural policies would
most greatly benefit the people of the United States and the cattlemen
of South Dakota?
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to estimate the extent to which
selected EEC agricultural policy alternatives would affect United
States imports and exports of cattle and beef products, and to hazard
conclusions concerning the effects of the various EEC policies on the
South Dakota cattlemen. The problem has been dealt with and conclusions
have been reached. It is the objective of this closing chapter to
briefly summarize this thesis and restate the conclusions arrived at.
It was first shox^n that the present and potential Common Market
countries are significant net importers of cattle and beef products
as well as of feed grains. An examination of the main world exporters
of these commodities showed the United States to be a significant
exporter of cattle and beef products, and a very large importer of
items within this general category. However, it was left to Chapters
III and IV to more thoroughly analyze United States trade in these
conmodities. In Chapter III, it was shown that the United States in
1962 imported cattle and beef products valued at $447,700,000. These
imports consisted almost entirely of live cattle and calves from Mexico
and Canada, and of beef and veal, principally from Australia, New
Zealand and Ireland. While these imports, consisting mainly of manu
facturing beef, do provide some competition for domestic beef producers,
they also serve the useful purpose of stabilizing beef prices.
Exports in the 1962 calendar year amounted to $201,500,000,
Thus exports of cattle and beef cattle products amounted to not quite
one-half of the value of imports of these same commodities. However,
these exports are very beneficial to domestic producers because they
consist almost entirely of what otherwise would be surplus stocks which
could only be sold at very low prices in the United States, if at all.
The chief export items were tallow and hides and skins.
An examination of the South Dakota beef cattle industry showed
that South Dakota cattlemen earned 3.7 percent of national cash incomes
for the sale of cattle and calves for beef purposes in 1961, and that
the South Dalcota share would grow to four percent by 1970. The signi
ficance of the beef cattle industry to the South Dakota economy was
shown by the fact that in 1962, incomes to cattle ranchers and feeders
accounted for over 40 percent of farm cash incomes in the state, and
7.7 percent of total personal incomes in South Dakota. Therefore,
anything that would seriously affect the cattlemen of South Dakota
would also have a great effect on the state as a whole.
Abackground to the Common Market and a summary of its progress
in development of its agricultural policy was then presented, Asystem
of variable import levies is to be used to regulate imports of feed
grains and beef and veal. This and other restrictions on beef products
such as import certificates and deposits could severely limit present
exports of these commodities to the Community,
According to the agricultural trade restrictions as proposed
by the EEC Commission, the Common Market could follow a policy of
autarky with regard to fresh, chilled and frozen beef and veal,
variety meats, canned beef and beef sausage. However, EEC Imports of
tallow and greases, beef casings and hides and skins were found to be
almost entirely unaffected by any of the policy alternatives considered.
This means that most United States exports to the Community will not
be hurt, even by a protectionist EEC policy.
The four distinct courses selected as possible for the EEC to
follow In Its agricultural policy were: 1) a protectionist six-member
community; 2) an enlarged protectionist community; 3) a six member
liberal-trading community; and 4) an enlarged liberal-trading community.
A study of present trade In cattle and beef products by the
Common Market was made, and It was shown that while the EEC Is a net
Importer of live cattle and calves. Its Imports come almost entirely
from other European nations. Thus, the future policy followed by the
EEC In this commodity will little affect the United States. Tlie six
nations Import a large volume of beef and veal, but these Imports come
mainly from Argentina and Denmark. United Kingdom Imports come from
Australia, Argentina and New Zealand.
The EEC In 1962 proved to be an extremely Important market for
United States feed grain exports. Projections of continued United
States exports to the Common Market under the various assumptions dis
cussed above showed that the United States feed grain farmers would
lose a very large portion of their sales to the Coimmsnity, if French
farmers, who have the resources to increase production of feed grains
considerably, were given the increased incentives of higher prices,
A protectionist grain policy would not only hurt grain producers in
the United States, but also would adversely affect United States and
South Dakota cattlemen, for it would mean greater production of com
peting meats such as pork and poultry at lower prices, and probably
increased domestic beef production at lower prices.
Consideration was then given to the effects of the alternative
EEC policies on the United States cattlemen. It was shown that United
States exports of cattle and beef cattle products would hardly be
affected at all, whether the Common Market was protectionist or liberal
in its trade. However, the United States import situation could be
greatly changed by the common policy. A restrictionist policy by the
six members would mean that about 284,000 metric tons of beef which
would otherwise be sent to the Common Market would be excluded from
entering the EEC. About 100,000 tons of this, valued at approximately
$71,000,000 could be expected to be redirected to the United States.
Since four percent of the nation's beef will be produced in South Dakota
by 1970, it was concluded that approximately four percent of this
$71,000,000 would directly compete with South Dakota's production, and
South Dakota cattlemen could expect to lose almost $3,000,000 in gross
cattle incomes because of this competition. This loss was computed to
be about two-thirds of one percent of gross incomes and three percent
of the net income of South Dakota cattlemen. If the ten member
Cotmnunlty became protectionist, approximately 150,000 tons valued at
$105,000,000 would be sent to the United States instead of to the
Common Market, and it could be expected that this would take away
about $4,200,000 in sales of beef cattle from South Dakota ranchers
and feeders. The loss was computed to be about one percent of the gross
income of South Dakota beef cattlemen, and about 4.3 percent of their
net income.
A liberal trading policy on the part of the Community is of
great importance to United States cattlemen. If EEC restrictions to
trade in these commodities between the Common Market and other nations
in the free world can be kept to a minimum, then the Common Market can
be expected to continue to be a large market for United States feed
grains as well as cattle products. Such a situation would keep the
United States feed grain prices relatively high, and this would be to
the advantage of United States cattlemen. South Dakota cattlemen and
consequently the South Dakota economy could not help but benefit by
such an arrangement. Furthermore, a liberal trading Community would
encourage large EEC imports of beef and veal, and exporters would look
to the attractive EEC market as well as to the United States. This
would take some of the competition away from United States beef
producers.
International trade in cattle and beef cattle products is impor
tant to the United States beef cattle industry and consequently to
South Dakota cattle ranchers and feeders* It is in their best inter
ests to help foster a free-trading Common Market. Cattlemen benefit
from the exportation of their surpluses* Producers as well as con
sumers profit from the increased price stability afforded by imports*
The cattlemen therefore, through their organizations and congressmen,
should actively encourage a Common Market with low restrictions to
trade* The United States government, in its dealings with the Common
Market in the "Kennedy round" of GAIT negotiations beginning May 4,
1964, must be firm in its demands for across-the-board reductions of
trade barriers to agricultural as well as industrial products* Only
by a vigorous stand can the United States hope to resist, with any
degree of success, the movement toward agricultural protectionism in
the European Economic Community* However, caution and skilful diplo
macy must be exercised by United States trade negotiators in their
dealings with trade representatives of the Common Market* An overly
aggressive and vocal attack by United States government officials on
protectionism in the Common Market might serve only to bolster the
arguments of protectionists in the United States* Protectionists would
use the government's attack to support their position and to persuade
the United States public that the only course open is retaliation by
increasing import barriers* To do otherwise, they would continue,
would be to sacrifice the economic interests of the American people*
This, of course, would defeat the government's original policy of
reducing international trade barriers, and would tend to increase
protectionism in the United States*
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
General Terminology
1# "Across-the-board" tariff negotiations: A method of negotiating
reductions in tariffs on categories of commodities rather than by items.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will allow the United States to use the
across-the-board method.
2. ^ valorem duty; Measured in percent and levied in proportion to
the value of the imported commodity,
3. Alliance for Progress: A development program for Latin America.
Within a 10 year period, $20 billion is to be supplied from outside
sources, mostly from the United States.
Balance of payments (BOP): An accounting statement setting forth
economic transactions involving the exchange of goods, services, gold
and capital claims between a country and foreign countries.
5. Balance of trade (BOT): The BUT is the difference in the value of
exports and imports. The BOT is considered favorable when exports ex
ceed imports in value, and unfavorable when imports exceed exports in
value.
6. Benelux; An economic union established in 19h7 by the Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg. The Benelux is now within the European Economic
Community and Is considered as a unit in most respects.
7. CAP: Common agricultural policy (see) of the European Economic
Community.
8. Carcass weight equivalent; The equivalent in carcass weight of
various meat cuts and products.
9. Cet; Common external tariff (see) of the European Economic Com
munity,
10, C.i.f.; Cost, insurance, freight. Means that the quoted price of
a shipment of goods includes the cost of the goods, the insurance costs
of shipping, and freight costs. The seller is responsible for all
three of these.
11. Common Market; see European Economic Community.
12. Comparative advantage principled Originated with Ricardo in
1817, Under free trade, a nation tends to import those goods which
other countries can produce more efficiently than it and to export
these goods which it can produce more efficiently than other countries.
13, Customs union; An association of countries that eliminates
tariffs, quotas and other governmental restrictions on trade among the
member countries and usually levies common tariffs on imports from
non-member countries.
14, EEC; European Economic Community (see),
15. Eurocrats: Refers to the approximately 6,800 employees of the
EEC.
16* European Economic Community (EEC): Also known as the Common Mar
ket, the Six and the Community, Established in 1958 by the Treaty of
Rome, and to be finalized by 1970, the end of the transitional period.
Present members are France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg.
17, European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Also known as the "Outer
Seven" or the "Seven", Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are the members. Established in
Stockholm in 1960 and provides for the gradual elimination of trade
barriers between member nations. There is to be no common external
tariff,
18, FAD: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(sec).
19, Favorable Balance of Trade: See Balance of trade,
20, F.o.b.: Free on board. The seller takes all responsibilities of
the shipment of goods from one country to another, including transpor*
tation costs, packing and insurance. The buyer takes over at a
specified point in deliveries,
21, Food and Agricultural Organization of the U, N, (FAO): Works in
the general field of agriculture. Much of its work is with under
developed countries, helping them to help themselves. Technical aid
is presently given by the FAO to about 100 countries.
22, Free trade association; An association of countries that have
eliminated most barriers to trade between members.
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Established in
1947 with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland to increase international
trade by reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. It now has 50
full members including the United States and accounts for about 80
percent of the world trade.
24. Gross National Product (GNP): The total value of all goods and
services produced by a nation's economy in one year's time.
25. Import Quota; see Quantitative restrictions.
26. Import tariff; A rate of duty on articles of merchandise to be
paid to the government for their importation.
27. "Kennedy" round; The sixth round of tariff negotiations to be
held in Geneva, Switzerland beginning May 4, 1964 under the auspices
of GATT.
28. Most Favored Nation principle (MFN); The willingness of a country
to grant the same favorable trade treatment to all countries that it
grants to any one country,
29. Multiplier principle; The way in which an increase or decrease
in capital formation can cause cumulative effects in the national in
come through consumer expenditures. The multiplier is the ratio between
the increase or decrease In income (Y) and the increase or decrease in
new capital information (I), i.e. Y = multiplier.
I
30. Oceania; A general term which refers to the islands of the Central
and South Pacific Ocean. In this thesis, it is referred to as including
only Australia and New Zealand,
31. Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC): See Organi
sation for European Cooperation and Development (OECD).
32. Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD): An
organization of 17 European countries plus Canada and the United States
whose purpose it is to achieve a good European economy through economic
cooperation. It was created in 1948 to implement the Marshall Flan
for European recovery,
33. Protectionism; The tendency to shield agricultural production
unduly from competition of imports,
34. Quantum: The price support system of France, It approximates the
usual consumption plus usual export sales. It will be necessary for
France to abolish the quantum system by 1970, the end of the EEC
transitional period.
35. Quantitative restrictions: Limitations on the quantity or value
of a product that may be imported into a country.
36. Trade barrier; Any obstacle to trade among nations. Some examples
are fixed tariffs, variable import levies, import and export quotas,
embargoes, licenses, exchange controls, state trading, bilateral trade
agreements, tariff preferences, sanitary regulations, and buy-at-home
legislation.
37. Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Provides broader authority for
United States negotiators than was contained in the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act of 1934, It allows across-the-board reductions on com
modities rather than the former item-by-item method used.
Common Market Terminology
1. CAP; Common Agricultural Policy (see) of the European Economic
Community,
2. GET: Common External Tariff (see) of the European Economic Commu
nity.
3. Common Agricultural Fund: A fund made up of contributions from the
six governments and from money received from levies on imports of these
commodities that will be used to subsidize exports from the EEC to
third countries, to contribute to structural improvement programs in
the Common Market and to buy up these commodities at intervention prices,
4. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): An agricultural policy in which
the EEC countries will change from their separate agricultural programs
to a uniform program. The objectives of the CAP are to increase
agricultural productivity, and ensure reasonable commodity prices to
consumers.
5. Common External Tariff (CET): A tariff rate to be applied by the
EEC by 1970 to imports from third countries.
Equivalent Coefficients; The difference in quality between the
standard EEC grains and imported grains. For each principal variety
of cereals, the lowest determined world c.i.f. price is selected.
7. Gate price: A minimum import price which approximates the target
price minus the fixed CET. Any time the product to which it applies
is offered at a price below the minimum, the difference is offset by
a levy.
8. Import certificate a; A certificate presented by the importer to
customs officials showing the origin of the imported goods.
9. Import deposits: The importer must deposit with his government
the price or part of the price of the imported goods. This covers
duties on imports and is refunded after arrival of the imports,
10. Intervention prices; or "support prices at the wholesale level"
are prices used by the EEC in administration of the variable levy
system. This is the price at which the European Grain Office under
the control of the Commission must buy all quantities of grain if they
should fall below the intervention price,
11. Lump sum; see Montant forfaitaire.
12. Montant forfaitaire; A sum substracted by one EEC country for the
levy assessed on grain imported from another EEC country,
13. Standardized c.i.f, price; The lowest world c.i.f. price plus or
minus equivalent coefficients.
l'^. Target prices; The target price reflects the Common Market's
price objective in the wholesale markets.
15. Threshold prices; A minimum import price used by the EEC in
establishing its variable levy system for grains and other commodities.
It is the target price minus marketing costs (such as transportation
and handling costs) from the port of entry to the deficit center for
which the target price is to be established, plus the montant forfaitaire
plus or minus adjustments for quality standards,
16, Variable import levy; The EEC threshold price minus a "standard
ized c.i.f, price,"
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PRCOECT NUMBER:
TITLE:
South Dakota State College
Agricultural Experiment Station
The Influence of International Agricultural Trade on
Marketing of Agricultural Products and the Economy
In South Dakota.
OBJECTIVES: 1. To evaluate the effects of International agrlcul<
tural trade on the marketing of agricultural
products and on the economy of South Dakota.
2. To derive therefrom the Implications of this for
Improvements or adjustments In marketing and
related fields.
REASONS FOR
UNDERTAKING
THE STUDY:
PROCEDURE:
We know that agricultural exports are important to
U.S. agriculture. These annual exports are valued
at about $5,130,000,000, The principal export
products Include wheat, feed grains, soybeans, and
livestock products, all of which are important prod
ucts of South Dakota agriculture. Agricultural
Imports Include livestock and products which may be
competitive. However, we lack accurate and meaning
ful Information concerning the actual amounts, effects
and meanings of international agricultural trade, and
all foreign trade, on South Dakota.
In addition there is a growing interest in this sub
ject among S. D. farmers and others. Extension
Service specialists have indicated a need for infor
mation adapted to the South Dakota situation.
Phase I:
Assemble and evaluate available information from
U. S. Department of Agriculture, U, S. Dept. of
Commerce, Customs Service, and other sources, to
determine in a preliminary way the importance and
effects of international Agricultural trade on
South Dakota* Also, identify subject areas on
which information is not available.
2. Obtain additional information if necessaryi con
duct correspondence and interviews to accomplish
this.
3. Analyze this information quantitatively or
qualitatively, as required, to define the situa
tion, effects, and particularly the implications.
4. Prepare one or more reports on the above,
(optional)
Phase II:
1, Choose one or more of the major implications from
Phase I, and study this in more detail. It is
quite probable that there will be important im
plications relating to:
(a) The potential markets for farm products, and
therefore the organization of S. D. farm
businesses and choices of enterprises.
(Example: Specific current and possible
future exports and imports of livestock
products such as beef and the meanings for
S. D« ranchers and feeders)
(b) U, S. Trade Policy as it affects U. S, and
S. D. Agriculture.
(c) The European Economic Community and its
effects on U, S. and S. D. Agriculture Trade.
2, Conduct any necessary field work on selected
topic(s).
3, Prepare one or more reports on this.
None at this station
Project Leader served as Administrator, Foreign Agri
cultural Service, USDA 1958-61 and gained practical
experience with the information and activities in
foreign trade.
EFFECTIVE
DATE:
DUEATION:
FINANCIAL
BUDGET;
DBEARTMENT :
PERSONNEL:
Current Projects in other states:
Arizona #^99 Evaluation of Impact of U.S. Agricul
tural Export on Domestic Agriculture. (Hatch;
IRM-1, Marketing - 1959)
California #1705 International Marketing of Agricul
tural Products (Hatch; Marketing - 1956)
Illinois #05-360 Export Market For U.S. and Illinois
Agricultural Commodities. (Hatch; Market
ing; 1957)
Michigan #ES562 Foreign Markets For Farm Products
(AMA; Marketing; 1960)
December 1, 1962
Two years
(Preliminary estimates for first full year)
Economics Department
Max Myers, Project Leader; Graduate Assistant
Clerical Assistant; Consultants (if needed).
